

**” Individually, we think and act for ourselves.
We have accepted the policy and so things
would not be different even if there were no
policy”**

A Study on The Consequences of The One Child Policy in
The Contemporary Chinese Labour Market.



Boris Garcevic, Kashifah Ashraf, Sama Sadat,

Heidi Smith & Chiara Bosboom

Supervisor: Afonso Moreira

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Motivation

This semester we have dealt with several international political policies. As power is important on both international and national level. We find this concept very interesting and therefore we have chosen to work with China. China is a country with great power and strong leadership. The theme we chose in this project is very interesting for us, as most of the policies China has made are very well-structured and thought through. However since the implementation there have been difficulties surrounding the one child policy, which was established in 1978.

The motivation for us to do this project is to dig deeper into the problems that this particular policy is creating. We think that the one child policy will have consequences of the structure of the Chinese labour market and we wish to investigate this possibility. This also includes the urge to research the Chinese history and the history of their political society. We are interested in gaining knowledge surrounding these problems. The results of our research in this entire phenomenon will hopefully be of use for other researchers.

We are interested in doing this project as the problem that we are investigating is an ongoing problem. We are curious about the mindsets of the population and how the government is involved in creating these.

Introduction

A problem in China can never be small when it is multiplied by a population of 1.3 billion people (CIA: online). Page after page is being written about China having great potential to become the next superpower. However given their population size and economic rise in the past decades, China is facing multiple internal problems. There has been a lot of controversy regarding how China is controlling their population and the multitude of problems they are facing, and the solutions to those problems (howstuffworks: online).

In 1978 China established the one child policy in order to decrease the rapid population growth. The policy showed its purpose in the first few years and gained great economic growth for China (Schramm, 2011). But in the past few years it has become clear that the one child policy might even have unprecedented societal effects such as abandonment of female children and a significant gender gap leaving more men than women (Hamme: online).

The effects of the one child policy are therefore very current as the Chinese societal and family structure is changing and thereby encompassing an incredibly large amount of lives.

Problem Area

Throughout the last 50 years China has been the subject of many debates and studies, particularly since its implementation of the controversial one child policy. Several researchers have researched this policy and its effects on society and politics. But most researchers were interested in the family structure and the fact that the children that are born in a one child family are getting more and more egoistic and selfish (Marketplace; China's one child policy, more kids or more stuff?: online). Even though the morality surrounding this issue is very interesting, it will not be discussed in this project. This project will concern the issue that occurs with the imbalance in the sex ratio and what effect this will have concerning jobs.

An area of possible conflict is the labour market where the configuration regarding gender could create an increasing problem. Different segments of the labour market have always had different gender ratios. With China now having almost 25% more males than females and a new generation that is stepping into the labour market, it seems inevitable that problems will arise concerning certain job sectors. As there are less people born there will also be less people available to fill up all the work places. The first generation of the one child policy is now hitting the labour market and gaps start to show in factories such as textile and garment, as there are not enough people to work in the factories. It is difficult for factories to keep their staff with the wages they offer (Marketplace; China's one child policy, the Chinese labour pool on decline: online).

In a documentary NPR reporter Scott Tong gives an example of two co-workers who fall in love but only have one child. This one child later has to replace both his parents in the factory, this is a good example of how it creates less people to work in the labour market (Marketplace, China's one child policy: online) There are a lot of up rises in the labour market by workers as they are not satisfied with the way they are treated. They do not earn enough money to pay all taxes, care for their parents and grandparents (Marketplace, China's one child policy: online).

Besides the labour market there are more aspects of the one child policy that affect the society. However we will only investigate the one child policy and the role of the government in implementing this and the consequences for it regarding the labour market. We will look at this in a generational approach, following a chronological timeline. Human rights, ethics in the case of good/bad will not be researched

upon. For this research we will interview different people who were born in this particular time where the one child policy was just introduced. Furthermore will we make use of various documentaries and information centres regarding China. Our research will aid different organisations and researchers who are looking into this problem in regards to intervene. This ties our research into the following problem formulation.

Problem Formulation

What are the consequences of the implementation of the one child policy in the contemporary Chinese labour market?

Working Questions

Which governmental aspects have contributed into creating the national identity and strive for modernization that we detect in the Chinese population?

What consequences has the one child policy of China had for the mind-sets of the Chinese population generations-wise?

How did the restructuring of the family affect the labor market?

Methodology and Approach

Epistemology

The analysis in this project has its theoretical standpoint in the post-structuralism. This analysis is based on works of Michel Foucault and authors who are inspired by his work. We choose to cherry pick different authors' concepts meaning that we are not bound to one system of thought but several who are working in the same field of understanding but could have different approaches.

Following the thoughts of Michel Foucault Post-structuralism denies stepping outside of discourse to objectively analyze since individuals are culturally and discursively structured. In the same line of thoughts, post-structuralism encourages being sceptical towards opinions and theories, claiming to be the ultimate “truth”. This approach refuses the idea of a basis fundamental structure which can explain how a given individual has been shaped and rather focus on the history of the individual. More so how different practices, institutions and techniques have shaped the individual in the sense of understanding and not in the sense of judgement.

The choice of epistemology is in the light of our problem formulation most suited for our project as we want to dwell deeply into the concepts of Foucault and Foucaultian inspired authors. We focus on the moulding of the mindset of the Chinese people and not on development etc. We will create our own understanding of the theories and apply them in our analysis.

Ontology

Following the line of our epistemology we reject the notion of positivism which is “social phenomena confront us as fact that are beyond our reach and influence” (Bryman, 2008: p.19). When we reject this notion it means that we take upon us the ontology of constructionism. Constructionism asserts that “social phenomena and their meaning are continually being accomplished by social actors” (Bryman, 2008: p.19) which harmonises with the theoretically point of views we will be using and our epistemology.

Deduction

Throughout this project we will not aim to build up a theory but we will draw upon theories that will form a base for our analysis. This approach of researching a problem is known as a deductive approach.

Archaeology and Genealogy

The concepts of archaeology and genealogy are closely related and used to understand and perceive how the present came to be. They can be summed up in:

- Archaeology is about understanding how objects came to be examining modes of knowing (epistemology)
- Genealogy is how these objects are perceived by subjects and how modes of knowing became modes of being (ontology)

As part of post structuralism and this methodology it is important not to search for hidden agendas and secret meanings in a document. Everything should be understood as written and “take statements as objects of study in their own right, making no effort to use them as means to revive the thoughts of the dead” (Ransom, 1997).

Through archaeology we will write segments of “the history of the present” of contemporary China and how the one child policy came to be. Our genealogy will be used to examine the subjects understanding of the one child policy and how this affects their lives and labour sector. We will throughout our analysis also use archaeology and genealogy as theoretical tools.

Research / Data Collection

In this project we will use both primary and secondary data. The primary data will consist of 3 interviews with people who are born and raised in China. They will have different backgrounds and education to a degree, but they will all have in common that they are the first generation of the one child policy. Another common denominator amongst the people we interviewed is that they are all from urban cities.

Our first interview was done with Xiaofing Chen, who is a male professor at age 31 who teaches at a nursing school and resides in Shanghai. Our second interview was with Huan Zhou, who is a 30-year old female professor, who teaches calculus at a university in Shanghai. Both of these interviewees were

in Denmark for a short period investigating the teaching methods in Danish universities. Our third interviewee was a female Chinese student named Lien Wu age 30, who is married to a Dane and resides currently in Denmark. She was born in Shanghai and moved to Denmark in 2005.

The interviews were done in a free flow semi-structured manner, where we sought to make the interviewees tell their own perspective and make them feel as comfortable as possible. We did round of the interviews with more pointed questions where we sought towards hearing their perspective regarding several matters such as the Chinese government, opinions and views on the one child policy and what problems they think they could face. The intent behind those questions where to see if we could discover or see a reflection of the views put forth by their government, or if they would have a more critical independent point of view.

Besides interviews with these three people, a member of the group has also had conversations with two other Chinese males that work in Denmark. This was not done in an interview format, but more in a conversationally manner. Their English was not so good and they do not speak any Danish since they have only been in Denmark for two years. Therefore we would not classify strictly as interviews, but there was still information gained from these informal inquiring conversations that was useful for our project. These two males were both 20 years old, and are therefore a part of the second generation of the one child policy.

The secondary data will consist of books, statistics, journals, documentaries, newspapers, article, research papers and the like. This means that the data will be both qualitative and quantitative. Besides that, we have information from articles that originates from China, which has been translated for us by a Chinese student.

An important part of the data we make use of comes from the author and anthropologist Ann Anagnost, who has done extensive research on China. She has published the book “National Past-Times” in which she investigates the shaping and the re-making of the Chinese population’s mindset. She examines various issues such as the culture debates of the 1980’s and the population control. We will draw a lot of our information from the data she gathered herself through many interviews, participant observation and documents. Furthermore we will also make use of some of her analytical results in our own analysis, as some of her theoretical tools are compatible with ours.

Case Study

A case study is a methodology tool, and a precise study of a specific case. There are multiple reasons for why our case is a case and this is because we are examining more than one specific case. The different cases we are examining are China as a country, the labour market in China and the one child policy in connection to the labour market. We are examining how these cases have/are affected by the Chinese bio-politics regarding the labour market and which effects the gender imbalance has on this. The anatomy of our research problem is exemplifying.

Limitations

We are facing some limitations in our research strategies and methods. The most severe one is that it was so difficult gathering empiria from China. If it was possible to gather empiria from China it could have been used as primary data. Since there has not been made a lot of research on this subject we are working on, most of the materials that will be needed for a successful project are difficult to obtain. These materials are most likely to be found in China, however China has recently opened its borders and therefore has not publicly published all their information regarding this problem.

We contacted various organisations in Denmark such as Human Rights Watch and “Den Kinesiske Forening” (Translate: The Chinese Union), but we could not get any insider information because they do not share their research data with the public. We also contacted professor Wie Zhang who works at the department of education and internalization at RUC and professor Cecilia Milwertz who works at the Nordic Institute for Asian Studies but we did not get any reply from them. We contacted the Chinese embassy in Copenhagen but they told us that we could not get any materiel for our project from them. For this research it is also difficult to find actual interviewees that are compatible to our research, as we will not be travelling to the country, we will have to find different ways to find suitable individuals.

Also it will be important for the value for this research to find both western viewed articles as well as eastern viewed articles. However articles made by Chinese individuals about this specific phenomenon are scarce, it is therefore difficult for us to write a fully objective project.

Analytical Strategy

The manner, in which we will conduct our analysis in, will go as following. We will first start with mapping out the intertwined field of intervention in which the one child policy was produced. This

includes looking upon the Chinese sense of national identity, the problematization of population and the creation of the one child policy.

From there on we will shift our focus on to the actual implementation of the one child policy. We will be looking at this from multiple angles and levels, which include institutions, regulations, family structure, propaganda, local authorities in cities and villages. Furthermore we will look at the government's attempt at re-making how the Chinese population relate to themselves, their family, the country, government and sense of national destiny and obligation. This chapter basically focuses on the generation that experienced the implementation of the one child policy.

We will then proceed to analyse the mentalities of the first generation that are a result of the one child policy. We will be looking at how the society is engaging them and the changes the policy has brought to the family structure and the Chinese sense of national identity. The methodological tools of archaeology and genealogy will be used heavily in these three analytical chapters.

This is necessary as the previous chapters should aid us in lining out the different political levels and mentalities at work and the mindset of the first generation of the one child policy. These are the people who are currently entering the labour market in China, and by mapping out their mindset and contextual knowledge of the Chinese society and labour market. Our aim is to what the consequences of the one child policy on the Chinese labour market are.

Theoretical Chapter

Power

When analyzing power one must not assume that the “*sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination are given at the outset; rather these are only the terminal forms power takes*” (Foucault, 1981: 92).

There are different mobilities that must be understood about power in the first place. Power in the sense of the multiplicity of force relations exist in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization. But also power as the process which through struggles and confrontations will transform, strengthen or reverse them. And power as the support which these relations find in one another hence forming a series or a system or on the contrary the disjunctions and contradictions which separate them from one another. And at last power as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is enclosed in the state apparatus in the formulation of law in the various social authorities. Power as far as it is permanent, repetitious, immobile and self-reproducing is simply put the over-all effect that is created through all these mobilities, the linkage/connection that rests on each of them and seeks in turn to arrest their movement (Foucault, 1981).

Power/Knowledge

Foucault focused his research on the dominant genealogical and archaeological knowledge systems and practices, observe them through different historical eras while including the social contexts that were in place that permitted change and nature of power in society. Foucault states that “*reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives*” (Foucault, 1980: 30).

Foucault believed that knowledge was a form of power, and said that knowledge can be gained from power thus producing it and not preventing it. Through observation new knowledge is produced. He states that knowledge is always connected to power thus creating the term power/knowledge.

Governmentality and Authoritarian Governmentality

The concept of governmentality involves a multitude of aspects that makes up the totality of the concept. Governmentality must first be looked as the governmentalization of the state, in the sense it is

an evolution of the medieval state (Ransom, 1997: 56-77). It is a development of it that has through its creation, produced a mass of networks and technologies, which through power relations strive towards certain strategies and goals to shape the population regarding health, economic and social life. In essence governmentality concerns itself with the management of the population, where it does so through its vast array of institutions, actions, analyses and tactics (Foucault, 2001: 201-222). It is the transformation of the medieval state into the administrative state that has become governmentalized through this process. It is important that when looking at governmentality, one does not see it as sole aggregate of institutions. Instead one also has to look at all the various networks and interdependent organizations that through strategies, power relations and authority endeavour to shape the population and therefore the society in a certain way (Foucault, 2001: 201-222).

Governmentality refers typically always to governmentality in liberal societies. Therein will liberalism manifest as a certain form of the shepherd-flock and city-citizen game, where - regarding the bio-politics and the administration of life - will stem from a pastoral power. This will be contained to an extent by a reason of state that will deploy laws and restrictions in order to regulate, secure and most importantly legitimize is various bio-political practices (Dean, 2010: 155-174).

Authoritarian governmentality should not be viewed as a separate entity completely without relations or parallels to the liberal forms of governmentality. They draw on the same powers, but the emphasis and use can vary. A glaring distinction can be made that the notion of a limited government in order to protect the individual, wherein a rule of law is created in order to secure the rights and freedom of the individual for the sake of the individual, is unacceptable (Dean, 2010: 155-174). In authoritarian governmentality one will find that often the strength of population is considered synonymous with the strength of the state. Therefore an improvement of the body of the population can manifest as the state choosing to disallow life of certain types of individuals, typically based on eugenics related to the symbolics of blood. Whereas the liberal governmentality will typically be characterized as refraining from exercising its 'right' to kill, the authoritarian will be characterized as one that will for the fostering of a better population (Dean, 2010: 155-174).

Bio-Politics

Bio-politics is basically technologies which can be used to control, analyze, define and regulate the human body and its behaviour and the human mind (Danaher, 2000). Within governmentality there are two *rationalities* which according to Foucault play a significant role in governmentality and bio-politics.

The rationality of “*reason of state*” is based upon totalizing techniques because it aims at strengthening the state by offering services to individuals as a means to achieve that goal. Contrary to this is the rationality which Foucault defines as pastoral power. This rationality is based upon individualizing techniques because it aims at the well-being of individuals and the state is in this rationality only the space or environment in which that goal is achieved. However even though these rationalities seem opposing there can be created cooperation and alliances in order to pursue the concept of governmentality (Ransom, 1997).

Rationalities

Within governmentality, it is possible to identify various rationalities at work. These explicit political rationalizations are traceable to certain times in history (Ransom, 1997: 56-77). The strategies that emerge from the modern regime of conduct of conduct stems from certain ways of thought that rationalizes them according to a certain value of truth. Rationalities are something that can be understood as certain systems of thought, where one can find links from them to different strategies, calculations and tactics concerning how the conduct of man should be (Rose, 2004: 24-28). Rationalities can be said to have a characteristic moral form. They consist of conceptions that characterize and measure the legitimacy of authority, the distribution of authorities across different areas like political, military, pedagogic or familial. They can include values or principles that shape the authority of freedom, justice, independence etc. In a sense they have their own episteme and work as a sort of epistemological character that works within many, if not all, layers of government and society (Rose, 2004: 26-27).

Reason of state constitutes one of the rationalities we will be using as an analytical tool. It contains the elevation of state interest over those of the individual (Rose, 2004: 24-28). They can and are however intrinsically interlinked in matters of governmentality and bio-politics, despite the differences (Ransom, 1997: 56-77). The reason of state is exercised through what is called *totalizing techniques* that is also called the city-citizen game. These techniques concerns itself with the how when it comes to shaping the human body for the better of society. They deal with man as a collective, where the body is a machine that can be inscribed upon as they see fit (Dean, 2010: 101-15).

Within totalizing techniques lie statistical measures that outline categories and parameters of various aspects of man. The totalizing techniques make use of these in ways to take inventory of how society is according to these measurements, and how to adjust it towards its goals. Man within the totalizing

techniques are not presented as something where one concerns itself with an individual, it boils down to the collective. There is created a concept of normality in which the totalizing techniques strives towards fitting man into through its various technologies and apparatuses (Dean, 2010: 101-15).

This is basically a shaping of positivities that is sought to push upon man in order to turn them through the totalizing and individualizing techniques into their own subjectivities (Ransom, 1997: 56-77).

The rationality of the *pastoral power* has spawned many new areas of thinking such as psychiatry. It consists of psychologist, psychiatrist, priest, spiritual figures and the like. They concern themselves with the interior, and the so-called mental and spiritual health of man. They sit in opposition to the reason of state rationality in the sense that they exercise a different form of power, and focus on the individual person (Ransom, 1997: 56-77).

From within this come the *individualizing techniques* that devote itself to the so called mental health of the mind and the physical health of the body, which is also known as the shepherd-flock game (Ransom, 1997: 56-77). It deals with the subjectivities of the self where it desires to discipline the individual. This can be in many different ways, e.g. in the way of morals, behaviour, values etc. It can also be about dealing with the well being of the ‘human soul’ (Dean, 2010: 89-100). About the well being of an individual which can be assisted through e.g. a pastor or a psychologist. A sense of normality is also transcendent into this area of individualizing techniques who judges healthy, sane, depressed, insane, normal, abnormal and such, according to a certain notion of normality. The individual itself may very likely feel not normal and seek out these exercisers of individualizing techniques in order to heal them.

Epistemological Thaw, Positivities, Subjectivities and Panopticism

The concept of *epistemological thaw* deals with the spread of what was previously considered expert knowledge and discourse contained within a group of specialists to the wider society. Certain expert epistemes have been created through time and – often – through institutions flooded out from its ‘normal circle of knowledge’ out to the greater populace. This is not just in a matter of discourse of certain types of knowledge, but also deals with how certain types of knowledge created - through an epistemological thaw - new institutions, subjectivities, genealogies and such. Examples of these are epistemes such as criminology and psychology (Foucault, 1977: 221-228).

As a following of epistemological thaw, a spreading of certain positivities can take place. *Positivities* (can also be interchangeable with the word objectivities to a certain extent) are understood as a sort of view put forth by others that are often interlinked with epistemes. In the case of expert knowledge these positivities can through epistemological thaw and panopticism imbed themselves into the general population and become a part of their subjectivities. *Subjectivities* are understood in a Foucaultian sense as the experience of the lived multiplicity of positioning. In his power/knowledge work he explained them to be positions which were formed within the apparatuses of power/knowledge, discursive practices and technologies of the social through which subjectification takes place (Blackman, Cromby, Hook, Papadopoulos and Valerie Walkerdine, 2008).

Panopticism is a concept which purpose it is to “induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power” (Ransom, 1977) which means that even though the action of surveillance is stopped, its effects are permanent on the inmate. Inmate can be understood as any subject in a society and it is through panopticism that one will often find the inner workings of epistemological thaw imbedding their positivities into the subjects’ subjectivities.

Games of Truth

Game is a set of rules in which truth is. In other words when someone create a set of rules or procedures in a field of knowledge these are then used to define what is valid (truth) and what is not (false). It’s important not to be led astray by the word game, as it is not in the sense of amusement but in the sense of regulations. (Foucault, 1980: 297) Truth is generated as consequences of these games and there often used by groups in connection with epistemes paradigms, governments and religions.

Symbolics of Blood

The symbolics of blood must be understood as a something that denotes quality tied into blood. This can be seen as for example in the Middle Ages, where the family you were born in decided your place in society. It was a societal structure built on symbolics of blood, where nobility and rights were decided by your ancestry. It must be looked at something that has actually little to do with actual blood, but more in a sense of using blood to represent a certain positivity. This positivity is always tied into a notion of quality and therefore with quality as its baseline it can be recast in different ways. Like how it went from in the Middle Ages to be a way of placing people in certain positions of power and social classes, it became under Nazi Germany recast as a concept of how the pure and highest quality race should be (Dean, 2010: 165-171).

The Usage of The Theories

The concept of power and power/knowledge is the basis for our project and can be seen in every aspect of our analysis. We are going to use governmentality, bio-politics and rationalities to map out how the Chinese government conducts the conduct of the population and how it affects their mindsets and moulding of the population. We will then show the interplay between the individualizing techniques and totalizing techniques and how this is played out in contemporary China. Through genealogy and archaeology we will show fragments of present history on how the one child policy was created and how this affects the subjectivity of the Chinese population. Symbolics of blood will be used to show how China views upon the quality of their population and how different geographical areas are viewed upon (rural areas for example). The epistemological thaw, objectivities, subjectivities and panopticism will be used to show how the minds of the people in contemporary China are shaped and how they through their own supervision govern themselves.

The History of China

The Geo-Political Factors

Portugal was the pioneer in most parts of Asia, also in China. After that the Spanish, British and French arrived, all to establish a foothold in the foreign trade. Trade between China and the West was passed in the pretext of tribute; foreigners were forced to follow the elaborate, centuries-old ritual entailed on envoys from China's tributary states. There was no notion at the imperial court that the Europeans would be treated as cultural or political equals. The only exception to the pretext of tribute was Russia, due to the fact that they were their neighbours and on top of that very powerful. Western diplomatic efforts to expand trade on equal terms were refused, the official Chinese statement being that the empire was not in need of foreign, and thus low-grade, products. Regardless of this attitude the trade started to grow even though after 1760 all foreign trade was restricted to Guangzhou. There the foreign traders had to limit their transactions to primarily officially licensed Chinese merchant firm (The emergence of modern China: online).

The Opium Wars 1839-1860

The British merchants were not satisfied with the fact that Russia had a treaty and that they still had to live up to the trade laws of the Chinese. This meant that the British had to pay more taxes and fees for their trade. The British sold huge amounts of opium to Chinese smugglers, which spread the drug through China, primarily its coastal cities. This created an increasing addicted and unproductive population and in March 1839, China took action against the foreign merchants and their Chinese collabourators. China ordered to close the port of Canton for all foreign merchants.

Great Britain blocked the Pearl River as a response to the closed port of Canton. This resulted in a naval battle in which the royal navy of Britain sank a number of Chinese vessels. This resulted in the fact that the British controlled the vast rice-growing lands of southern China by the end of the first war, and they could continue their opium trade (Allingham, Victorianweb; England and China: The Opium Wars, 1839-60: online).

China's first major compromise was to pay the British six million silver dollars for the port of Canton instead of defending the port. By the middle of 1842 the British controlled the mouth of the Yangtze – the main trade route in China at that time - and Shanghai. Furthermore the Chinese were forced to sign the first series of unbalanced treaties, which changed the control from being in the hands of the Chinese

to the West. Great Britain obtained the most favoured nation status for trade and the Chinese also paid the nine million dollars back, which China had taken from the merchants when they destroyed the 20.000 chests of opium. Furthermore China had to abolish the trading monopolies and limit their tariffs to five per cent. Finally, and probably the most important to China's loss of nationhood, the north Chinese signatories accepted the notion of "extraterritoriality". This meant that the Western merchants were no longer liable to the Chinese laws but to those of their own country (Allingham, Victorianweb; England and China: The Opium Wars, 1839-60: online).

The fact that another war was coming up seemed inevitable, as the Chinese officials were very unwilling to keep to the terms of the treaties made between 1842 and 1844. Great Britain insisted that their "most-favoured nation status" would be exercised in 1854. But this time they wanted more. They ordered that China must open all her ports to foreign trade, legalise the importation of opium from British properties in India and Burma, excuse all the British goods from import duties and grant the permit of the establishment of a full embassy in Peking. In 1857 the British sent forces to Canton in coordination with American warships. The Chinese surrendered and permitted all foreigners with passports to travel freely in China plus granting Chinese who changed to Christianity full property rights.

Because the Chinese officials did not allow the Western embassies in Peking, the Anglo-French forces launched an offensive from Hong Kong in 1860, with that they destroyed the Emperor Xianfeng's Summer Palaces in Peking and wide-spread looting by both troops and civilians. Ultimately Prince Gong, the brother of the Emperor signed the Convention of Peking in 1860. China had to pay ten million taels (silver coins) to British merchants for destruction of property. Finally the Chinese gave up the port of Kowloon to Great Britain and agreed to allow the export of indentured Chinese labourers to America.

The humiliation of the treaties eventually led to the fall of the Manchu Dynasty and the social disturbance that hurried the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 (Allingham, Victorianweb; England and China: The Opium Wars, 1839-60: online). The Opium wars worked as a dynamo for the Chinese society to demonize the West. It was then that China did not want to work together with the Western world anymore, as they felt that they were betrayed and humiliated.

The Great Leap Forward 1958-1960

The economic development of the People's Republic of China started under Mao Zedong's supervision. Mao had the idea that by the end of this development in 1988, the People's Republic of China would be able to rival with the economy of the United States. For this development he had 150 development projects planned, which were financed and staffed by the Soviet Union. When Mao and the Soviet Union started to have problems about their political ideologies the Soviet Union took back all their staff and the blue prints for the projects were destroyed. This was a big problem for China as they themselves did not have the technological and financial resources to handle this project on their own. Mao Zedong was now convinced that China had to industrialize on its own, as it was not reliable to count on any of their alliances.

The first thing Mao decided to do was to organize the Chinese peasants into communes. This took away the land that had been given to the peasants in the years after 1949. The peasants now were awarded with land and the landowners were removed. This was very popular under the peasants and gave Mao therefore a lot of popularity. However the land that was distributed to the peasants was taken away by the State after ten years (San José State University, Department of Economics: online).

This system of dividing residency permits is also called the *Hukou system*. It was in order to minimize the movement of people between rural and urban areas. So the Chinese citizens were classified as urban or rural based on their *Hukou* (residence); urban residents received state allocated jobs and access to an array of social services while the rural residents were expected to be more self-reliant and furthermore producing for the state. Where the peasants were in the beginning so happy with the fact that they received their land, they now considered the step back they took as having to work harder. Therefore a lot of citizens tried to migrate to cities but the government made a law against that shortly after. The law stated that anyone seeking to move to a different place than where their household originally was registered, had to receive approval from the Hukou authorities. However this approval was rarely granted. It functioned as more or less like an internal passport system and still does (College of Arts and Sciences: online).

Meanwhile the peasants were supposed to melt down scrap metal to make iron and steel for tools. But in practice the peasants melted down useful items to produce unusable masses of metal. Local communist leaders would be punished if their area did not meet the quota or if important and useful items of metal were melted in order to meet the quota. Mao had more of these projects throughout whole China, however he did not think about the fact that all this labour would be taken away from producing food,

which led to a shortage in food supply. The central government made things even worse for the peasants as they took a share based upon the falsified production figures, thereby leaving the peasants with too little to survive on.

Famine proceeded and was very severe in some areas. This was a result of the policies and centralization of power in the central government. The famine was kept secret from the outside world until China began to open up to the outside world and demographers analyzed the population statistics. In the end Mao accepted the fact that the Great Leap Forward was not a success and Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai were needed to help China out of its miserable situation. In 1966 Mao tried to gain absolute power again, which resulted in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 (San José State University, Department of Economics: online).

The History of The One Child Policy

Population control has been an issue in China since the 1950's and the first initiative to achieve it was under Mao in the 1970's with the later-longer-fewer policy. The three components respectively meant: later marriages and later childbirths, longer intervals between childbirths and fewer children.

Furthermore was age specified for each component in order to assist the enforcement of the policy. The numbers of children was also specified in relation to the geography of the country as couples from urban areas were allowed to have two children and couples from rural areas three. This was tried out and adapted in different areas before it was officially announced as a national guideline in 1973. However this policy was not a policy in the sense of being part of national legislation but was regulated impromptu. However, the policy was promoted throughout the nation and the significance of it was emphasized until 1978 when the rules were tightened. (Greenhalgh, 2008: 66-67)

The death of Mao in 1976 led to a shift in the political landscape of China as the new leader Deng Xiaoping set the goals to modernize the economy and to restore China's position in a global context. In 1978 demographic data showed that a huge baby boom was waiting ahead and that it would make it harder to achieve the goals of the party with a rapid growing population (Greenhalgh, 2008: 81). Around the same time was the Birth Planning Leading Group re-established which had first been formed in the 1960's. Because of the information about an expected baby boom the Birth Planning Leading Group shifted the attention from the later-longer-fewer policy to "one is best, two at most". This policy was endorsed by the Central Committee in October 1978 and was the first to encourage one-child families (Greenhalgh, 2008: 86). Already in 1979 did the politicians start to shift the focus from "one is best, two at most" to "encourage one, prohibit three" (Greenhalgh, 2008: 90-91). This new focus

resulted in that the Birth Planning Leading Group discussed the ideas of a legislation which could specify the numbers of children couples could have. Those ideas were approved by China's leader Deng and other top population leaders. During 1979 had 27 out of 29 provinces adopted some kind of trial regulations on birth planning (Greenhalgh, 2008: 92). Meanwhile were specialists called in to help the Chinese leaders to scientifically formulate the policy of slowing population growth, which was finished in 1979 (Greenhalgh, 2008: 93).

An Overview of The One Child Policy

The one child policy promotes one child families and forbids married couple from having more than one child in urban areas in order to handle overpopulation in China and to be able to feed the entire population. There are some exemptions for parents without any siblings themselves, ethnic minorities, if your first born is handicapped you are allowed to have more than one child in some areas it is allowed to have two children if the firstborn is a girl and in some cases wealthy families pay a fee to the government in order to have more than one child.

“According to official researches made in China 1,8 children is being born per family today, and when the policy was implemented in the country there was 5,8 children born per family” (facts and details: online).

The government officially created the policy to prevent social, economical and environmental problems in the country. In order to maintain a stable economical growth in China the policy has to be maintained, also because China is suffering a lack of resources' such as water and liveable areas for the large population (Rao and Sexton, 2010). The Confucian aspect of sons in Chinese families taking care of the elders and carrying the family name has led to a favouring of having sons rather than daughters among Chinese couples (Milwertz, 1997). This has resulted in female infanticide because of the easy access to get an ultrasound to reveal the sex of the child many couples decide to get an abortion. Furthermore it has also led to abandonment of female children and many females are born without a registration means that they cannot benefit from social services such as education, health care etc. This problem has led to an inequality in gender that is so huge that by the year of 2020 experts predict 300 million more men than women in the Chinese population (Rao and Sexton, 2010).

The problem of male prioritization has led to an inequality in gender that is so huge that by the year of 2020 experts predict 300 million more men than women in the Chinese population. This imbalance will weaken social stability as more men will remain unmarried and this will lead to antisocial and violent

behaviour, but it is not only here this huge imbalance will have its affects – the labour market will suffer from it, because there will be this huge lack of jobs because of the low number of female workers in the society. When the law was implemented it was agreed that it should be set up for discussion and maybe be changed 30 years after the implementation. The national commission in China has rejected the law to be abolished or any radical changes being made in the law in the nearest future. But despite this rejection there has been a lot of debate about it being necessary to make some changes in the law because of the outlook that the proportion of the aging population, who is depending of support from the younger generation, will be very high compared to the amount of workers in the population. The prognoses in Shanghai shows that 30% of the population will be in the age of 60+ over the next decade, and that is why the local commission of family planning has made it legal for couples who were born as a single child is allowed to have to children (Rao and Sexton, 2010).

China Opening Economy Borders

Since 1976 there have been some major changes in China's political economy. The changes in China's political economy started with the reinstatement of Deng Xiaoping, however he won the struggle against Hua Guofeng in 1978. Several speeches were held that year concerning the achievement of "the Four Modernisations". That were those of agriculture, industry, science and technology and national defence. In the speeches it was made clear that China needed the investment of foreigners in the Chinese society to achieve the modernisation. A lot of the members of the Communist Party were not convinced by the need of change and with that the intervention of international corporations.

To make the modernisations possible the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) told the economic control of the Party to be more decentralised and thereby give more independence to the local governments and managerial responsibility to the economic units including the farms and factories. Furthermore it wanted to give a bigger role to the prices and for introduced free markets in the rural sector. With that they also set up a legal framework and independent judicial institutions to certify the success of the reforms (Fukasaku, Wall and Wu, 1994). The central committee of the CCP believed that the Four Modernisations were achievable within the idea of the Four Cardinal Principles which were; socialism, the people's democratic dictatorship, the leadership of the CCP and the guidance of the "*universal principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought*" (China Quarterly, 1979, as quoted in Spence, 1990; 658, as quoted in Fukasaku, Wall and Wu, 1994). Coca-Cola was the first company that reached an agreement to open a bottling plant in China while the Plenary Session was still going on.

The two most important goals of the reform, regarding the economic management system, were the decentralisation of China's centrally based economy and the reversal of the policy of international economic isolation. But in an economy that is transitioning from a centrally based economy to an economy where market forces are going to play an important role, all the changes brought in the policy are interdependent and mutually supporting. The results are determined by the extent to which decision-makers, who relate to that world, are affected by the conjugal policy changes. If they are able to lift the constraints on their freedom of action in the domestic economy then their international opportunities are improving. And if reforms in the domestic policies link rewards to action, than the willingness to do so is higher. In China's case both of these reforms happened. The decentralisation enlarged the range of individuals and enterprises able to respond to international signals, and liberalisation of domestic factor and goods markets increased their capability to do so. The changes in the incentive structure made it more attractive for people to engage in international economic activities (Fukasaku, Wall and Wu, 1994).

Reforms and Opening Up

The changes that were made in December 1978 during the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP are known in China as: Reforms and Opening Up. *“The ‘Reforms’ are the policy changes which have introduced decentralisation and moves towards more reliance on market forces. ‘Opening Up’ refers to the policy changes aimed at increasing the integration of the Chinese economy into the international economy”* (Fukasaku, Wall and Wu, 1994: 24) This meeting could be seen as the allowance of the possibility to introduce the liberalising economic policy measures into China. Since this reform in 1978, there have been a lot more reforms on the economy. These reforms can be grouped in three categories:

1. Ownership and management reforms; these regarded the realisation of limited residence rights in agriculture, the realisation of a private sector, encouragement of the co-operative sector and the integration of some state industries into enterprise groups. Under the contract responsibility system these enterprises and unreformed state enterprises have been given more diplomacy over the use of the resources at their discarding, in particular by the replacement of the central collection of all profits with a tax system.
2. The significance of decentralisation; all productive units owned by the government, this could be provincial, municipal, central ministries etc. are not longer tied to a planning process. They now have discretion about what to produce and where they want to sell it.

3. The area of price reforms; many price controls have been lifted. However there are still products where the decontrol has only been lifted partially, so they are subject to dual pricing. This means that they have the controlled price, which is required under the residual command economy. And the price that is established on the marketplace.

These three categories has led to the establishment of markets, both in retail and wholesale, for consumer and producer goods and factors of production. These markets have now partially or completely replaced state distribution systems, or operate in direct competition with them (Fukasaku, Wall and Wu, 1994: 25).

Analytical Chapter

Chapter 1 – The Creation of National Identity and The One Child Policy

The Start of National Identity

Most of the conflicts regarding China and foreign forces touched primarily coastal cities and Southern China. Leaving most of the rural areas unaffected and consequently they at first did not feel a sense of powerlessness and humiliation from the foreign powers. This left urbanites vulnerable towards discourse and positivities that spoke to their sense of disgrace. It was from the start of the 1920's that the Chinese Communist Party and other socialist movements, started to create several games of truth throughout the usage of power relations that took advantage of this (Anagnost, 1997: 17-44).

A leader of one of the socialist movements introduced the concepts of Marxist ideology, primarily socialism, nationalism and democracy. The CCP built on to this as they sought to recast it as timeless entities that had always been present in Chinese society. Within these entities were class, society and nation that was set forth as a part of China's history. The goal was to create a national identity that rooted itself in a supposed class struggle, where by realizing this, the Chinese population would be able to move forward from its failing traditional roots into a more modern, stronger and civilized nation (College of Arts and Sciences: online).

These games of truth had to create and validate themselves through several means. To begin with, it was important to set forth positivities that felt timeless and made the Chinese population able to identify them in a historical context. Social realism literature was one of the main tools used by the CCP, as they sought towards creating an episteme that encompassed these concepts. They had to create truths that they could imbed into the subjectivities of the population for the purpose of inventing a national identity and control (Anagnost, 1997: 17-44).

The literature involved several aspects. Within it often you had a persona that symbolized the underpowered and bitter person, who suffered misfortunes but was unable to understand why. These people were symbols of tradition. They expressed sorrow and hostility towards their unfortunate situations, without truly understanding that their source of misery was their unawareness of the class struggle they found themselves in. The antagonism of the narrator is set forth as an outpour of emotions and frustrations, that raged at their situation. This narrative was called speaking bitterness and was used

to a great extent in the time period of 1911-1949 as a tool to imbed a sense of ever present class struggle. It was important for the instigators of these truths that a sense of history became attached to the concept of class struggle. This would work towards validating it as something that has always been present and as something that the people must recognize as a part of their own identity and history. For this would then enable the government to easier convert the positivities, regarding the communist ideology and national identity into subjectivities. Since it would make the population more receptive for these games of truth if they believed them to always have existed (Anagnost, 1997: 17-44).

The social realism literature served as a form of archaeology, as it introduced these concepts of class struggle as history and China as a nation with a national identity. The class system itself was a form of power/knowledge that through power relations sought to validate and manifest itself as a truth. The power relations helped structure the procedures that created the games of truth, as they were used in discourse and particularly in the speaking bitterness narrative and thus became a more solid social reality. Creating a way of knowing their own class structure and position within, the Chinese population were then enabled to internalize themselves within this hierarchy and change it into a genealogy or in other words a way of being.

The literature did not only work on a narrative giving level, which served as a form of self-identification with the narrator or other characters within. Behind this was also the reshaping of how the population should relate to themselves as an ethical being. By ethical being we mean the way a person should conduct himself. It must be understood that the positivities created regarding the national identity and class struggle, was not only framed and generated in the literature made to reshape the subjectification of the population. In a framework of truths that were represented as ethics, they capitalized on the feelings of humiliation and frustration of the Chinese populace. Their feelings were funnelled towards a collective identity, that presented itself as the future of China and its citizens. A more modern, stronger and civilized citizen that symbolized China that would help lead it towards its national destiny. A destiny that included overcoming their rivals, and China taking its rightful place as the leading nation of the world (Anagnost, 1997:120-121). It was particularly important to appear more civilized for China's own sense of pride. It took on an increasingly stronger and whole host of meanings as time passed, amongst those it was connected to a sense of quality regarding the Chinese population. The word Wenming, had many meanings but for the Chinese, it primarily meant to be civilized and thus ready for modernization, and showing China's supposed enemies that China was not an inferior backwards country (Anagnost, 1997: 75-97).

For the Chinese populace the class system functioned as a way of framing in their position in the greater society, while the national identity worked as the aggregate that brought them together and would help move them towards their destiny. It became more internalized by involving the ethical aspects. First off they enclosed the national identity as something that should be worked over on an emotional level. Besides increasing or inciting a sense of humiliation towards the treatment the foreign powers bestowed upon them, they also attached a sense of collective and obligation. Becoming the modern subject, was not just a matter of doing the right thing for yourself, it was also for the better of the nation. Following the idea of a national identity, the Chinese citizen was made to believe it was a higher calling to do so. This kind of concept of creating a sense of duty towards something holistic is also known as mode of subjectivation (Anagnost, 1997: 17-44).

Together with social realism literature and demagogues the sense of timeless class system was imbedded into the subjectivities of the population. The speaking bitterness provided the class system relation, while the national identity and the modernity connected to it, created a sense of hope for overcoming this. Basically by the Chinese relating to themselves as a person in a class struggle, the class system became materialized for them in their subjectivities. By acting accordingly to the role of a modern subject set forth by the national identity, the Chinese asserted themselves as ethical subjects. By conforming to these notions, the population would act in accordance to several ideas of how the modern civilized subject should behave.

With the spread of epistemes surrounding the notions of class system, nation/society and national identity the Chinese population started to relate to these things as something that had always been. They created the class struggle, which was originally a positivity set forth by several socialist movements including the CCP. These concepts became rationalities through the games of truth constructed by the CCP, and other similar movements that dominated the time period of 1911-1949. This time period denotes a time of revolutions and creation of new positivities made subjectivities. With Mao's rise to power in 1936, the idea of never having been in a class system seemed absurd to a great many of the population. This is reflected in our interview with Lien Wu where, when we brought up the idea of class struggle being something new in the 20th century, she laughed and said it was something that had always been a part of China's history.

By the time that Mao achieved full leadership of China in 1949, the governmentalization of the state began to take place with him in the front.

The Governmentalization of Government and Problematization of the Population

Late 1949 the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson taunted New China by claiming it was unable to feed its people. Mao replied to the taunt with this speech:

“It is very good thing that China has a big population. Even if China’s population multiplies many times, [the PRC] is fully capable of finding a solution.... [R]evolution plus production can solve the problem of feeding the population... Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Under the leadership of the communist party, as long as there are people, every kind of miracle can be performed... All pessimistic views are utterly groundless” (Mao 1954 [1949]: 453-454).

This speech was a part of Mao’s constantly changing his mind regarding the size of China’s population. It took 25 years before Mao finally decided which way the bio-politics of China should go, by stating in the State Planning Commission’s Report on the 1974 National Economic Plan: *“It won’t do not to control population [growth]”* (Greenhalgh, 2008: p. 52).

In early 1957 Mao changed his ‘the more the merrier policy’ into the idea that he wanted state planning of birth (Greenhalgh, 2008). This is the first detection of the problematization of the population number. However his plan on the Great Leap Forward was of more importance as he changed his mind a year later again by stating: *“For now a large population is better”* – Mao, (January 1958) 1958-1960 (Greenhalgh, 2008: p. 52). During the Great Leap Forward, Mao’s policy was that China did not need the help of other countries, the west in particular, to become modernized and according to Mao, China had to pull itself up by its own power.

During the Great Leap Forward the already existing Hukou system was tightened. When Mao came to power, the function and the objective of the Hukou was changed and enforced into something entirely different, showing the first signs of the rise of the administrative state. They re-arranged the Hukou system as an administrative division within the state, with the purpose of restricting the movements of the population. The registrations of every aspect of people’s life were strong totalizing techniques used to create a more structured China. One of its objectives was to stop the massive migration of people from rural to urban areas, which was a huge problem to the state after they took away the land of the

peasants at the start of the Great Leap Forward. It divided people into geographical areas favouring the urbanites. The quality of education and the state services differentiated or lacked depending on where the local household was tied to. The education system and medical care were both inferior in the rural areas compared to urban and insurance was unavailable to those with a rural Hukou (Treiman & Zhan 2011).

Employment had to take place within the geographical area that your household was located. The control went deeper in the sense that, if anybody were to change their job they had to report this and have it recorded. This systematic control enforced a notion of inferiority regarding the rural population, where the urbanites were favoured, particularly when it came to qualifying for education, retirement benefits and medical care. A person's Hukou category affected to a large amount ones rights, privileges and heavily influenced the socioeconomic status of an inhabitant (Treiman & Zhan 2011).

During the starvation the Hukou system became a deadly aspect of the totalizing techniques employed by an authoritarian governmentality. The state distributed food based on the Hukou system, where the rural areas were down prioritized. Urban areas received higher rations and CCP personnel flooded the urban streets ensuring that no people with an agricultural Hukou had managed to sneak past the check points. Any rural person that was successful in entering a Hukou area that was considered urban, still faced the issue of not having the proper Hukou. They were quite often caught either by CCP personnel or turned in by others that did not want to be known as collaborators and lose their rations. The massive starvation on the country side was kept a secret from most of the urban citizens. A prioritization of the urban population took place by Mao and the CCP, where the feeding of the urban population was considered more important, than providing food for the rural. The rationality of reason of state worked as a justifying view for choosing to elevate different categories of the population over another. The choices made by the CCP to deny the starvation ravaging the rural areas, disregarded the lives of the rural population. Mao and the administration utilized the perceived right of the authoritarian state to exercise the right to take life or foster it. In their indifference towards the lives of the country side population, they used this power. It can be argued that they perceived this to have been necessary as food was scarce, but in this time period they sold grain to Russia, which seems to indicate that the priorities of the state, was not the rural population (College of Arts and Sciences: online).

The totalizing technique of the Hukou system, with its choices reflecting a view of second grade citizen of the rural population, ties into the symbolics of blood. Already with the creation of national identity

during the revolutionary and chaotic age of 1911-1949, the label of the uncivilized were often placed upon the rural population. The perception grew in strength with the Hukou system and a notion of quality became more imbedded in the subjectivity of national identity regarding wenming/civilized and class (Anagnost, 1997). The symbolics of blood was being gradually recast into a context of social classes; which were divided based on geographical areas. This was further enforced by the already present subjectivities that considered rural people to be less wenming than urban. The Hukou system with its laws and personnel worked as a further re-enforcement of these notions.

The Hukou system created another effect in the Chinese society, a strengthening and impressive show of panopticism followed it.

The totalizing techniques at work in the Hukou system created a sense of self-awareness regarding one's own status in a rural/urban system. In rural areas local CCP leaders worked as organizers and regulators of the residing population, with the added job of having to ensure that they would fulfil quotas regarding production. The type of panopticism at work in those areas, where heavily focused towards production output. Many local CCP leaders lied or manipulated numbers in order to live up to impossible quotas. The workers were under the gaze of the CCP leaders and produced goods despite atrocious circumstances. Panopticism played a huge part in the continuation of production despite the starvation taking place. The number of rural bodies by far outnumbered the CCP personnel presence in the country side, yet no significant revolt took place. The agricultural Chinese population kept on producing through combination of a sense of national calling by the mode of subjectivation and the self-regulating inner watchmen of panopticism. For the agricultural Chinese to be wenming, they had to modernize and to achieve that, they had to produce the tools and goods that would lead China into its modernization. Failure to do so would be a further humiliation to their own sense of pride as a nation.

The subjectivities surrounding nation and the Chinese identity together with panopticism, functioned as a way where the Chinese themselves put the rationality of reason of state on themselves. Or in other words, they sacrificed the individual for the sake of the collective. Reason of state is typically considered to be applied by the state, but in a paradoxical situation a reversal took place in the sense that the national identity made the individual sacrifice themselves for the supposed greater of the state.

In the cities the heavy enforcement of the checking of the personal passport placed a profound physical presence on the streets. The CCP checked homes and work places constantly in order to flush out any

unwanted agricultural people. If one were to aid them, they risked loss of their own urban Hukou, rations, jail or worse (Milwertz, 1997: 86-120). This worked as a reinforcement of the inner watchmen of panopticism. Seeing what amounted to the physical manifestation of the watchmen, led to a stronger sense of panopticism amongst the urban population during that period. It also heightened the sense of self-awareness regarding their place in the Hukou system, and the sense of one category having more value than the other. In other words, it was also a fortification of the symbolics of blood and a show of the development of bio-politics.

The Great Leap Forward and the starvation were a vital time in the creation and enforcement of the authoritarian state. In the years following these events, population as a problem became more focused upon. When China opened its borders in the late 1970's, the issue of population as a problem exploded. Statistical measures worked as a harsh wake-up call for the Chinese officials as it worked as comparative means to other countries. China's isolation had led them to believe that they were a lot more modernized compared to other countries than what they really were. China seemed unable to escape its own self-imposed sense of backwardness and failing (Greenhalgh, 2008: p. 108).

The Birth of Expert Knowledge

Mao's support for birth planning in the early 1970's started the process of making a policy and program on this issue and for the first time in China it was extended to include the whole nation (Greenhalgh, 2008: 53). In this period The Birth Planning Leading Group was re-established, which was in charge of managing the birth planning policy and below that was an administrative office re-established within the Ministry of Health. Li Xiuzhen, a specialist in women's health was named as head of that office and she mainly represented the power/knowledge as she approved and promoted the population policy and program as positive for peasants, women and health (Greenhalgh, 2008: 60-61). She encouraged statistical workers to invent some ingenious methods to create an episteme of population control, but their methods were not usable on a national level. Social scientists were also working on those methods but because they were not able to forecast future population growth, it was limited what those methods could be used for (Greenhalgh, 2008: 65).

After Mao's death the Deng regime worked on modernizing the economy and restoring China's position in a global context. The shift from Mao to Deng also led to a shift from grounding birth planning in ideology to grounding it in science. However, population studies did not exist at that time so in 1976-77 population research offices opened in universities throughout China. The State Council named the

People's University as the nation's leading centre for population research. The decision of making this new academic unit was from the State Council and not the university as it usually was. The purpose of this was to strengthen the totalizing technique of the authoritarian state as the government got support and legitimization from the nation's best scholars for the new project of population control. This meant that the scholars would sometimes have to subordinate the academic concerns to the political ones (Greenhalgh, 2008: 99-100).

The main issue in the work of population control in China has always been that it should be grounded in Marxian theory, which is clearly distinct and contradicts Malthusianism (Greenhalgh, 2008: 101). The state had to ensure that there were no breaches in the ideological foundation of Marxism. Travelling further down this road Marxism had no records what so ever on restriction of population growth and focused more on production. His belief was that capitalism would deplete resources but under socialism the population would be the most valuable for the state (Greenhalgh, 2008: 69). In other words population *growth* was important for the Marxist ideology, which is further emphasized by the following quote: "*As the population grows constantly and rapidly, the labour force will also grow rapidly and will contribute to the well-being to the society*" (Wang Hong 1991: 62). This was also voiced by China's neighbour Russia with the authoritative voice of Joseph Stalin who viewed population growth as a law of population under socialism. (Greenhalgh, 2008: 69)

In order to overcome this Anti-Malthusian problem, the CCP had to keep their ideas in the Chinese ideological repertoire, though this made the problem even greater as there was little to draw upon. The CCP had to create this expert knowledge in this paradoxical setting, which posed an almost impossible challenge, however in 1974 a promising passage was discovered in the works of Freidrich Engels. It was the notion of twofold character of production regarding human beings and material goods, and it was discovered by some Marxian theorists (Greenhalgh, 2008: 70). The passage was underscored in a letter by Engels to Karl Kautsky a century earlier stating: "*If communist society should one day be compelled to regulate the production of human beings, as it regulates the production goods, then it and it alone will be able to do this without any difficulty*" (quoted in Liu 1981 in Greenhalgh, 2008: 70). Thus by this passage Engels made it possible for the CCP to join together production of goods with production of human beings without using Malthusian theory.

With experience gained throughout several years discussing population planning, Chinese writers were able to elaborate on Engels point, setting up a frame where production regulation of human beings was

anti-capitalistic (Greenhalgh, 2008: 70). Capitalism left the reproduction of humans anarchic, but socialism is able to bring both growth of population and economics within a unified state plan. With this angle it was easy for the CCP to set it up and tying it to the national identity. They put it as crucial, not just to the socialist development of China, but also to the larger mission of socialism to outcompete capitalism on the world stage (Greenhalgh, 2008: 70). For this purpose was a group of Marxian statisticians formed in 1974 who later were the central actors of the Population Theory Institute at the People's University. However, those statisticians had to start from scratch on this work, because at that time there was no reliable national data of demography. Another problem for all social scientists working in this field at this time was the authoritarian governmentality. This was seen as several party factions, who were using the social scientists as propagandists to produce theoretical justifications for their policy preferences. Hence the first experts who worked in the field of population control mainly in the 1970's were affected by the ideology and politics of that time (Greenhalgh, 2008: 105-106).

The statistical measures worked as way of creating a narrative that was representative of the scientific reality. For the construction and communication of scientific facts, representation became a crucial aspect and worked as a huge part of its power. It could be split into two categories. First one was quantification/statisticalization, which operated as transformative means of converting textual statements into numerical ones. By changing the textual to numerical, the statements took on an aspect of truth for the readers. The second tool was Visualization that worked as an ocular means of manifesting natural objects and relationships to be scientifically visible. This presented science in a understandable manner for the average person (Greenhalgh, 2008: 109-110). The Marxian statistics and the episteme of numbers changed the way China perceived its population problem. The authoritarian state internalized these tools within its arsenal of totalizing techniques.

The reason for implementing the birth policy was due to the fact that several studies showed, that made use of these statistical measures, that a rapid population growth could damage the party's larger projects, especially since a huge baby boom was impending China in 1978. Setting up a policy on population control was the beginning of the bio-political turn China would take (Greenhalgh & Winkler, 2005: 93).

Chapter 2 - Governmentalities at Work – The Implementation of The One Child Policy

The Interventions of The Government

Before the actual law on the one child policy was established, the state had different statements regarding birth planning. In 1978 there was an article in the Constitution of China stating; *“the state advocates and encourages birth planning”* (Milwertz, 1997: 5). Making it seem as if the population is merely encouraged by the government to exercise birth planning. Later on in 1982 the article had been changed into: *“the state promotes birth planning in order to achieve compatibility between population and socio-economic development”* (Milwertz, 1997:5). Here making it of more importance to families to practice birth planning, they link it together with the idea of development and by extension China’s attempt at modernization. This ties into the imbedded subjectivity regarding national identity and they appeal to that through this choice of discourse. It still presents itself as non-coercive but it is a shift from the almost gentle encouragement that was first found in the article.

As the article did not manage to progress into a national law, the state made more adjustments to it in order to make it seem like for the population that it was a law, but for the outside world claiming that it was not. Stating that *“both husband and wife have the duty to practice birth planning”* (Milwertz, 1997: 5). Therefore they strengthened the tie towards the national identity as it was their calling for the nation to do this transforming it into a mode of subjectivation. Lastly in 1992 the state implemented the birth planning in the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women; stating that *“Women have the right to childbearing in accordance with relevant regulations of the state as well as the freedom not to bear a child”* (Milwertz, 1997: 5). By the continuous changes in the laws regarding marriage and women’s rights, the discourse tones shifted gradually with it eventually sounding like it was almost illegal not to practise birth planning. Furthermore in the late 1970’s the rules regarding sterilization became harsher, it was now required to become sterilized after giving birth to a fourth child. Which lowered in 1975 to three children and in 1979 to two children.

By attempting to implement this positivity into the subjectivities of the population the government used totalizing techniques that grew from small interventions, to people resisting and forced abortions. Especially people in the countryside resisted the policy, as they needed more people to work on the farm and because of Confucianism. They tried to do anything to not have to answer to the policy, this

included forging documents, concealing pregnancies and bribing officials to not have to pay the fine. This even went further with pregnant women leaving before campaigns and fleeing from their area in order to carry out their pregnancy.

The birth control cadres were instructed to do corporal tasks that would prevent more babies from being born. These tasks included aborting unauthorized pregnancies, forcing women to get an IUD and even sterilization of one of the family members, most of the time the woman. Most women tried to undo these interventions by going through fake sterilizations and removing their IUD's, which included severe health problems. The government applied the reason of state in conjunction with the local cadres in order to legitimize the corporal tasks. The rage went further on when the government insisted on the local cadres that "*all actions that control the population growth are correct*" (Greenhalgh in Rao and Sexton, 2010: 305), where the local cadres then performed abortions on full grown foetuses and in some areas some women were even handcuffed and forced into agreeing to abortion.

In the rural areas there was a lot of resistance especially after the totalizing techniques of the government became harsher. Peasants even attacked birth cadres personnel in their desperate state. Later on, as this had no effect, many were frantic for the chance of another child that would be male and abandoned their baby girls, suffocating them or throwing their bodies into lakes or wells. This in the end drew so much attention that People's Daily wrote an article warning that "*at present, the phenomena of butchering, drowning, and leaving to die female infants... have been very serious*" (Li and Zhang, 1938 in Greenhalgh in Rao and Sexton, 2010: 306).

The government stated that they were going to use three measurements to achieve the implementation of the one child policy. The three measures consist of ideological education, administrative and economical aspects. However the ideological education and economic measures were interlinked, as the economic measures would follow if the ideological education would not be effective enough (Milwertz, 1997). This statement was in contrast with the resistance and famine that was going on in both the rural and the urban areas, where there were different totalizing techniques at work. The authoritarian governmentality and the reason of state did not essentially care what measurements were taken in order to achieve the implementation of the one child policy, as long as success was achieved. In other words, the government was exercising its perceived right to either take life or foster.

The Local Cadres and The Birth Planning Workers

In Beijing during the time period of 1967-71, women giving birth to a second child within five years was 75.8 per cent. This stands in stark contrast to the numbers in 1982-88 where it had dropped to 16.5 per cent. The efficiency of the policy can be credited to many things, but one of the main aspects was the work done by the local cadres and the birth planning workers (Milwertz, 1997: 26).


The national identity makes way for the aspect of reason of state, where the individual acknowledges that the interests of the state takes priority. The Chinese government credits some of its success regarding implementing the OCP that the process involved what is classified as more-or-less voluntary action mixed with state directives. The state supplied medical equipment, knowledge, personnel, materials and funds for the objective of downsizing the population growth. On the other hand, the state allowed and encouraged to an extent the public to participate in the debates surrounding the matter of population control and the OCP (Milwertz, 1997).

This gave the illusion of influence and made the policy seem less constrict and open as they felt they had a say. They identified to an extent as active participants in the shaping of the OCP and the population debates. In order to take part of the discussions they started to make use of the discourse of the experts and thus started to move the expert knowledge discourse into their own, aiding the epistemological thaw. As overall result the population was less resistant due to these illusions set forth. The local cadres and birth planning workers played a huge part in aiding the epistemological thaw and a form of acceptance of the policy from the majority population. They created a tight control network that spanned nation-wide, in particular in the urban areas where it became nearly impossible to have a second child, without the knowledge of local authorities. This network of control was shaped through power relations that functioned both as a totalizing technique, as they were an extension of the reason of state, but also as an individualizing technique through the social contact and relationships formed between the birth planning workers, medical staff and the families involved (Milwertz, 1997: 87).

It was a governmentality aspect of the authoritarian state that functioned on two levels in particular. It was structured in such a manner that there were two dividing areas. Residential areas were split into subsequent districts that would belong to certain local birth planning cadres, and the work place had its own connected birth planning offices. Underneath this home and work split were smaller departments that split the population into their own more localized units. It should be noted that there is a difference between the levels of control in state owned enterprises vs. private enterprises (Milwertz, 1997: 86-120).

The primary focus will be on the state owned, as the private enterprises functioned as a sort of loop hole at the time of implementation of the OCP.

Figure 1: Structure of birth planning institution in Beijing



Source: Adapted from C. N. Milwertz, *Accepting population control*, 1997, p. 93

A birth planning commission consisted of three divisions that are responsible for propaganda, planning and liaison work with propaganda and ideological education being prioritized the highest (Milwertz, 1997:93-94).

The birth planning workers at the residence keep track of the females in the childbearing age bracket in their area. They perform house visits, distribute pamphlets, execute administrative tasks where in they keep track of the conceptive means of the females, pregnancies, applications and possible certificates (Milwertz, 1997: 86-120). They work strongly together with the birth planning workers in the workplace cadres. There exists a network of checks and balances with shared information in order to maximize knowledge and minimization of illegal births. They also work in tandem regarding problems with families that were resisting the policy. At the work level, a woman becoming pregnant with second child would be fined, and experience heavy pressure from both divisions of birth cadres.

On the other hand for families complying with the OCP, they could obtain several rewards such as an increase in salary and vacation days. Furthermore they would be elevated as better citizens who are beneficial for the nation (Milwertz, 1997: 86-120).

The residential and workplace cadres checks and balances work together heavily on a bio-political level as in order for a woman to gain a permit for having a child, she must receive approval from both divisions. If one division rejects, experience has shown that the other one will follow as consequence. This helped ensure that it is harder for a female to trick the system, bribe or falsify permits, as one office will check with the other. In order to truly grasp the level of control and state intervention on the female body, one must take a closer look on the functions of the actual birth planning workers, and which individualizing and totalizing techniques gets exercised through them upon the population, and the females that they manage.

The primary tools and goal of the birth planning workers were ideological education, propaganda and economical incentive. Propaganda work was beyond extensive and included many different events, programs, personas etc. Birth planning workers would hang up posters and articles, give out pamphlets, arrange meetings, and make use of the workplace intercom system to play messages promoting people to conform and follow the OCP (Milwertz, 1997: 86-120). Creating an environment flooded with positive messages about the OCP, and advertising conformity.

Massive campaigns take place two to three times yearly, usually arranged around times where weddings boom. These huge campaigns can involve the entire city or even the whole nation. A yearly campaign is the January Birth Planning Month that lasts an entire month and is executed nationwide. An example of the scale of these campaigns can be taken from the 1989 Birth Planning Month, where over 15 million cadres workers and 700.000 medical personnel were involved. Radio programs, television programs, more than 300 articles were published in news papers, while well-known population experts went out into different districts and held speeches and answered questions (Milwertz, 1997: 86-120). This kind of colossal campaigning is a massive feature in creating the epistemological thaw, where through heavy exposure the knowledge starts to imbed itself into the daily discourse and subjectivity of the general population. The bio-politics becomes common in the public sphere and even highlighted as something almost normal for a country to concern itself with.

This leads to a form of normalization and sense of familiarity for the Chinese populace. The daily exposure to these things enables the notions of birth planning and one child to become common discourse and a part of everyday life. The propaganda does not only work as a way of reshaping and moulding the opinions of the populace towards the OCP, but also works in a manner of making population control and the means of solving the presented problem as normal. By removing the feelings of alienation regarding the bio-political state intervention on matters of reproduction, it becomes easier for said state to manage and control the bodies of the population.

The propaganda in question is not just a promotion of OCP but also ideology. This is due to the fact that the OCP is heavily made up of ideology, and therefore ideological education is considered another important aspect and part of the work of the birth planning worker. The birth planning worker is responsible for performing this task by not only handing out information, but also through visits at family homes, appointments and daily social contact (Milwertz, 1997: 86-120). The birth planning worker functions as a means of the totalizing techniques where they seek to imbed ideology and thereby also govern bio-political policy into the minds of the people. They are the transformative bodies of positivities into the general population. But they also work as generators of individualizing techniques through the interaction with the women they work with, as they single them out and therefore creating individuality.

The ideological education takes from the expert knowledge created around the OCP and the population problem episteme. These things draw from Marxist ideology and the created national identity, which has been enhanced with a heavy sense of mode of subjectivation. That way the OCP becomes a call of the nation and creates a deeper sense of obligation towards following the policy.

As a Beijing woman put it in an interview, May 1992

Q: “Why do you have only one child?”

A: “I have answered the call of the nation.”

Source: Milwertz, 1997: 65

Another path they take is usually categorized as persuasion though one could argue that it qualifies more like harassment and coercion. In many cases where a female in the childbearing age becomes pregnant with her first child, a permit will be granted. But in cases where it is a second child, penalties and persuasion will take place. Fines, loss of job and even punishment extended to colleagues can take

place. Typically that is done if the woman does give birth to a second child. Before she gives birth, the birth planning workers will take strong measures towards trying to persuade the woman into getting an abortion. They will go visit her home and try to talk to her. They will try to appeal to her sense of national identity and sense of practicality, by trying to paint an image of hardships should the woman give birth to another child (Milwertz, 1997: 86-120). The woman in question is exercising individualizing techniques through her resistance. She asserts her own individuality through trying to stand by her own choice regarding her own body.

The birth planning workers would be persistent in their visits as shown by the following account where a birth planning worker was advised on how to deal with a woman who refused to get an abortion. She asked her superior on what to do and the following reply was given: “*Go back and talk to her again*”(Wolf, 1986: 114), which the birth planning worker did over and over again. As she and others failed they would then proceed to visit her neighbours and inform their surroundings about the fact that a family was resisting the policy. This was done so in order to make the neighbours to talk to them.

It basically created an environment of pressure where the pregnant woman would be looked down upon by her peers, who would beleague her about her selfishness or express their opinions as concern for her wellbeing. The body of the woman became something for others to freely discuss and intervene upon, as the epistemological thaw and shaped subjectivities regarding OCP, population control and national identity normalized it to do so. Any sense of privacy regarding the woman’s body is completely discarded as an unusual notion, as bio-politics have made the female body something one is free to inscribe upon. Furthermore these inscriptions that should be placed upon the female body have been pre-decided by the authoritarian state, and attempts on resisting these inscription and trying to privatize one’s own female body, would be met with punishments in different, before mentioned, forms. The spiral of isolation also serves to show the increase of the individualization of the female, as she tried to resist. When she would finally comply she is still resisting but by complying there is no need for further action towards her (Milwertz, 1997: 86-120).

The women who were of childbearing age were persuaded to come to meetings that were constructed to inform about birth control. Furthermore the pregnant women were carefully monitored in order to make sure that after this pregnancy there would not follow another one. This monitoring was not only done by birth planning workers but also by the neighbours that were informed about this. In a research of Arthur P. Wolf he asked one of the birth planning workers how the leadership was able to keep track of so

many people, especially the ones who tried to conceal their pregnancy, she laughed and replied, *“In this commune a woman who isn’t eligible to have a child can’t eat two pickles in one day without having someone come in the evening to urge her to have an abortion”* (Wolf, 1986: 109).

Panopticism played a big part in the ideological education, as the birth planning workers were fearful for the fine they would receive if a family did not follow the birth policy. This explains the re-visits and the informing of neighbours to help increase the chance of changing the family’s mind. The panopticism worked for both the birth planning workers and the population. However later on the birth planning workers did loosen up on check-ups, but the population then was afraid of a check-up and kept monitoring their behaviour accordingly (Wolf, 1986: 110-111).

The actual relationship between birth planning worker and a female in childbearing age could be seen as an exercise of individualizing techniques. She individualizes the female she interacts with. Through seeking to perform ideological education, the birth planning worker involve themselves with the interior of the females. They desire to re-arrange the internal in a way of realigning it according to the positivities they put forth. This is so they can shape the subjectivities of the females and in this manner the totalizing techniques of the birth planning worker, also function as an aspect of individualizing techniques. The ideological education interacts with the ethics and interior of the females, and is touched by both individualizing and totalizing techniques through the birth planning workers (Milwertz, 1997: 86-120).

It should be kept in mind that overall, research has shown that there is a heavy focus on the body of the females but it is not grounded in concern of their physical wellbeing as such, but more in the management of said body. This shows quite strongly in the way they inform females regarding contraceptives. Research shows that generally birth planning workers do not inform females in childbearing age of contraceptive measures until after they have given birth to their first child. After the birth of the first child, it becomes a priority for the birth planning worker to ensure that the mother makes use of a contraceptive means in order to make sure that a second pregnancy will not take place. It is compulsory for a mother to make use of contraceptive means. Financial incentives exist for females choosing to make use of IUD’s (Intra-Uterine Device), which is the preferred contraceptive means of the state. This is because they consider it the most fool proof as it does not rely on people remembering to use it, but instead involves a mere small insertion. Another aspect of this is the fact that it is difficult to remove an IUD by yourself as it will cause pain and is typically done through a small surgical

removal. This works as a way of discouraging women from removing it themselves if they want to regain the opportunity to become pregnant. The IUD therefore works as an aspect of control inserted into the actual female body in order to aid the bio-political goals. The government ensures through keeping databases and statistical totalizing techniques, that they are able to keep track of these women and call them into regular check-ups to ensure the IUD's are still inserted and working properly (Milwertz, 1997: 86-120).

IUD's are not the most effective contraceptive compared to sterilization, which carries with it a much stronger monetary reward and promise of more vacation days. While birth planning workers would never discourage a mother to get a sterilization, they typically try to make them get an IUD as females are more receptive towards them as it has become very normal for females to get one after they have had their first – and only – child. Sterilization represents a definite end to childbearing and therefore is less popular compared to the IUD that still offers a hope of childbearing later on. This is particularly a concern in case of child mortality (Milwertz, 1997: 86-120).

The birth planning workers are very persistent in their objective of ensuring the mothers to make use of contraceptives, and will make use of coercion and ideology in order to ensure that the mother will make use of contraception. Both the birth planning workers in the residential and workplace cadres keep track of the contraceptive use of the mothers, and keep close look out for any signs of pregnancy. In case of a female choosing to make use of other contraceptives such as the pill or condoms, the birth planning workers will most likely keep on trying to make her change her mind to get an IUD and keep a closer look on the female. They express themselves as concerned for the wellbeing of the female and try to appeal to their sense of logic, by talking about how it would be impossible for them to provide for both of their children. The birth planning worker is inserting herself/himself into the matters of reproduction, as it is very important for them that in order to ensure the bio-political goals of the state, that no illegal second births take place. The individual desires of wanting to be in control of your own body and how to manage your own reproduction, gets overruled by the reason of state as they seek to manage these matters (Milwertz, 1997: 86-120).

Birth planning workers are responsible for keeping track of the contraceptive measures that all females that have given birth make use of. This is carefully organized in databases and also shaped into statistics, that seek to provide so called scientific knowledge for the state to utilize in their totalizing techniques. The statistics and information work both as something that tightens and strengthens the

network of the OCP. Quota's are ascribed to different districts in order to maintain the control on the population, driving the birth planning workers to reach these quota's as they are directly under the authoritarian governmentality and will get punished if they will not reach this quota. Birth planning workers therefore take initiative on deciding if a woman should undergo abortion or not. The idea that an abortion is the decision of the individual is not something supported by the government, as it works against their bio-political goals (Milwertz, 1997: 86-120).

An example of that can be made from the following case, where a 40 year old female had re-married a divorcee who had two children, and she herself became pregnant with her first child. Two birth planning workers were in disagreement of how to deal with this. One wanted the woman to get an abortion, and the other wanted her to have the child. In the end they compromised on making the woman getting an abortion and giving her a permit for a child afterwards so she could get a child through the set of administrative channels (Milwertz, 1997: 102). The body of the female served no more than the field of intervention, where the birth planning workers could decide upon how to best exercise the bio-political goals of the state and how to ensure that it followed the proper procedures.

An evolution of this tight network of control by totalizing techniques have translated as care for the females. The inquiring into the bodily, contraceptives and intent regarding reproduction comes across as concern for the wellbeing of the females. This idea is further supported by the visits paid by the residential birth planning workers and the bi-yearly to yearly check-ups paid by the government of mothers. It helps making the females more receptive towards the ideological education and persuasion employed by the birth planning workers and makes it easier for them to shape the perceptions and there by extension their subjectivities. The perception of care becomes linked with as an expression of care by the government and helps create a sense of reciprocity. This strengthens the mode of subjectivation and builds up a sense of indebtedness from the females. This again works as an enforcement and aid in shaping their subjectivities regarding the OCP and birth planning (Milwertz, 1997: 86-120).

In urban areas it is practically impossible to avoid this tight network of control, unless one works in a private enterprise where the penalties will most likely just be financial as the state is unable to fire you. That does not mean that birth planning workers will not attempt to make use of ideology, feelings of national identity and persuasion. Monitoring and control is a part of daily life in urban areas and also to moderate to high extent in rural areas. The network is much tighter in cities as it is geographically easier to monitor and organize the populace in such areas. In essence no matter the area, the local cadres and

birth planning workers play a huge part in the effectiveness of the OCP (Milwertz, 1997: 86-120). The ideology education serves as a fundamental aspect of imbedding the positivities surrounding the OCP into the common populace, something which is severely helped by the ongoing epistemological thaw. Panopticism plays an implicit and explicit role in the shaping of subjectivities and epistemological thaw. The propaganda makes the Chinese constantly aware of their inner watchmen, and aids the self-regulation measures and pushes the behaviour of the person towards the government desired conduct. The birth planning workers function as a physical manifestation and helps shape the conduct of the population, in particular the females as they are considered the ones primarily responsible for the matters concerning reproduction. That is only in so far as ensuring that they reproduce as set forth by the government framework. To step outside the females become problems that the state must deal with, and measures must be taken in order to make them fall back into the bio-political placed lines.

The National Identity in The Media

The experts working on the implementation of the one child policy were affected by the political agenda of the government until and during the implementation of the policy. The policy was implemented mainly through the ideological education system of the population, which was carried out by party workers at local levels creating an epistemological thaw. This meant that the episteme of population control created by the experts was spread out to the population through the ideological education system of the government (Greenhalgh, 2008: 66-67).

One of the methods used to educate the population regarding birth planning was the use of press/media, which served as a feature of governmentality. The concept of governmentality consists of several aspects, which in a combination creates the totality of the concept. The press/media is one of the aspects of governmentality because it in this context functions as propaganda. Propaganda consists of controlled information passed on to an audience with the purpose of affecting the target group in a particular way (Nie and Wyman, 2005: 318).

The propaganda consisted of information, which was illustrated through every kind of virtual sources such as radio, newspapers, television, billboards etc. These were totalizing techniques of reason of state as they served as pro-policy messages. These messages displayed the one child policy continuously through the virtual media so that the importance of the policy could not be ignored or overlooked (Nie and Wyman, 2005: 318). The messages delivered to the citizens through the media were characterizing

population projections as scientific and was used to argue for making the one child policy seem like a logical and obligatory solution (Nie and Wyman, 2005: 319).

The first mass campaign endorsed by the government with regards to birth planning was the campaign called the later-longer-fewer (wan xi shao). The campaign promoted later marriages, longer intervals between births and fewer children. This policy was made in the continuation of the national reproductive guidelines from 1950 which promoted late marriage and few births. Propaganda regarding population problem had already been published as early as in 1962 in the “China Youth Daily”. This newspaper was addressed to the youth in China. One year after this article got published the policy was tested in different areas and after several trials was the policy announced to be a national guideline in 1973. The propagation of the idea of this policy before the actual implementation through the press/media had the effect that a part of the population was prepared for this policy (Greenhalgh, 66).

This shows how the press/media was used for promoting birth planning targeting different age groups in society and thereby affecting the subjectivities of a large part of the population. This is seen in this quote of an older interviewee who was 49 years at time of the interview in 2003:

“Among us, we had an understanding that the government had no choice. ... If China kept growing, everyone would starve. Right? So, no other answer, no choice. ... If the government didn’t take action, everything would become chaotic. We were lucky to have such an effective government, unlike before.”
(Nie and Wyman, 2005: 319-320)

This quote is from a later time period as it is from the time of the inception of the one child policy. The quote emphasizes the strong national identity, as it shows the collective feeling and understanding towards the government. This is seen in the quote because the man refers to his fellow citizens by saying “us” and “we”. Also, it is a quote from an older man and therefore it gives an understanding of the shaping of subjectivities, because he has experienced the development from the ideas of birth planning to the actual implementation of the policy. Furthermore this man was in the age group that was the target group of the government’s propaganda work, as he was young at the time of the implementation of the one child policy (Nie and Wyman, 2005).

This strong national feeling is common among the Chinese people and the totalizing techniques used this national feeling to achieve their goals regarding birth planning. The government’s methods to shape

the subjectivities of the population was to present scientific data to show that, without this policy the people in China would grow rapidly and thereby people would starve. By using these methods the people would feel a duty to help the country and this aspect was implemented in the national identity (Nie and Wyman, 2005).

The first propaganda posters to put a positive spin on family planning started around early 1960, but various campaigns to get the message forward started already in the mid 1950s. The main target group here was women as they were viewed as being responsible for becoming pregnant. The central theme in those posters was later marriages and fewer kids in order to help with China's production of goods (Chinese Posters: online).

The campaign posters shifted focus in the years following the implementation of the one child policy. Instead of focusing on women only it was on the whole population. The campaigns in the 1980s, having fewer children were not just tied into only economical development. Also an emphasis was set on fewer children or just one child, which was set up as being a criteria in order to modernize and reform China (Chinese Posters: online). Not only that, in the mid 1980s fewer kids was tied to the notion of quality and authoritative scientific arguments was used, claiming that one child only would improve the gene pool. The following picture will be used to show how these elements were presented in the posters.

Figure 2. Propaganda image



Source: Do a Good Job in Family Planning to Promote Economic Development, 1986, retrieved from chinaposters.net

The text which is not only written in Chinese but also in English has a very strong and clear message. In order to promote economic development of the country, you had to do a good job in family planning. The fact that it is also written in English shows the western influence and the need to be modern. The picture itself is very thought through not only in the sense of tying national identity and modernization to it but also in the way they used imagery. The high-rise buildings in the background of the picture were one of the various elements, which crept into not only this picture but most traditional posters during the 1980s and 1990s. Another well known symbol on the poster is the white dove. In a global sense the symbol is usually tied to peace, love and devotion (Bella: online). However in China the white dove means peace and long life and was consequently used on many posters. The symbol of the white dove was tied to the one child, which implied that if you got one child only you would get a long and peaceful life.

The small flag in the upper right corner, which is the flag of the PRC, is subtle at first but you know it is there. It puts even more emphasis on the strong connection to the normalization of the one child policy for the sake of the state and country. Repress the need for more children and help the country prosper. Also it is the highest object in the picture which could signal the higher calling of the state connected with the white doves for peace and prosperity. The remote control, besides being the symbol of total control, was a part of modernity in the 1980s and is used as a symbol for advanced technology and prospering. Consumerism started making its way in the urban Chinese society where commodities became the ultimate sign of modernity, status and financial security (Anagnost, 1997: chap. 5).

The child and woman, who one would likely to presume is the mother, in the picture are strategically placed in the sense that the mother is at the central of the picture looking up at the child who is showered in the light of the sun and heaven. This gives an effect of the only child being sent from above in a way a deity grants wishes from above.

The only child in a light red scarf on its way down to its presumably mother, while she is looking up at it considering the previous sentence, gives a notion that the woman have to receive the child. The child and the woman play a central part in the poster as they represent the human symbolism. They are the ones that the receivers of the poster are supposed to relate to and identify with.

These positivities were put forth since the mid 1950s all the way up to present day, with this picture serving as an example, other medias as television, radio and internet was employed as well. Especially those living in the city would get affected by these posters as they were being exposed to these positivities several times every day. It helped imbed the subjectivity regarding the one child policy and fortified the sense of national identity and mode of subjectivation.

The Reshaping of The Family Structure – The Urban/Rural Divide

The family structure before the OCP was heavily influenced by Confucianism that was practically synonymous with what was considered traditional Chinese civilization at that time.

“The family was the basic unit of society, and directives for well-ordered relations in both family and society at large... Each member of the family and of society was strictly bound by the obligations and obedience owed to other members... Confucianism was protocol regulation all social relations in the family and in society at large, based on a patriarchal, patrilineal and patrilocal family system”

(Milwertz, 1997: 45)

The ideal family put forth by Confucianism was a large one with many sons, but high infant mortality rates and socioeconomic circumstances prevented most of the rural population from realizing these goals. The family structure in China was changed after 1945 as the families in the urban areas became smaller and those in rural areas became larger, with a lower mortality rate based on estimations. The Confucian ideal of a large family could thus be realized in rural areas and thereby the families in rural areas could achieve a large family with many sons. A large part of the baby boom that took place in China during the 1950's-60's can be credited to Confucianism (Milwertz, 1997: 44-46).

Another aspect regarding the family structure was the hierarchical rule arranged according to age and gender. With the OCP, it invertible clashed with the basic principles of Confucianism and also presented itself as a socioeconomic problem. The patrilineal aspect of Confucianism ensured that family line, property and lands were passed through the males of the families. Females were barely considered to be part of their birth family, as they were married into other families and placed in the patriarchal hierarchy within that family. Males were inscribed with higher value than females, whose worth was measured into their ability of birthing sons. Even before the OCP, the preference for males showed strongly in the subjectivities of the rural population, as when food became scarce, girls were typically the first ones to die, as food was distributed in favour of the males.

The son-preference in the rural areas tied quite heavily into the need for economic support for parents in old age. Families in the rural areas preferred sons because they were more dependent on their help. In urban areas the families also had an inclination for sons but not in the same degree as in rural areas, where sons played a bigger part when it came to cultivating the land and providing for the family. Furthermore was the economic dependency less strong in urban areas and those aspects resulted in lower urban fertility rates. Another aspect of it was the government encouraging women to enter the labour market, in order to aid gender equality and lessen fertility rates (Milwertz, 1997: 45).

At the same time rural families were getting bigger because they wanted to achieve the Confucian ideal and because of the decrease in mortality rates. This meant that the fertility rates started to decline in the urban areas already in the 1960's but this took place not earlier than the 1970's in the rural areas when the government started the campaign of later-longer-fewer.

For majority of the rural population, which made out approximately 80% of the Chinese population, the OCP presented a huge issue. Having only one child, which was female, spelled the end of the family line (Milwertz, 1997: 46-47). In rural subjectivities, the natural way of social relations were placed in a hierarchical system, that placed a male as the head of a family and the state as the entity above it. The nation calling dictated that they had to only have one child, even if it was a female. This positivity was heavily resisted by the majority of the rural populace as it stood against their Confucian based values that were a heavy part of their subjectivities. To follow the OCP also made them vulnerable due to socioeconomic system they existed within.

In the first few years following the implementation of the OCP, it failed majorly in the rural areas, which lead to the authoritarian state launching nationwide crackdowns primarily focused on rural areas. The corporal aspects of the totalizing techniques were brought out in force, in particularly through the usage of party personnel that were encouraged to use any means necessary in order to live up to the quotas set forth. The bodies of the females truly became problematized and treated as a field of intervention where the reason of state took priority above all (Rao and Sexton, 2010).

This resulted in physical confrontations between party workers and local peasants. Couples would attack the party workers trying to resist the physical intervention coming from the state. Before during the starvation at the end of the Great Leap Forward, the combination of totalizing techniques,

panopticism, national identity and mode of subjectivation kept most of the rural population from going against state directives. But with the OCP that brought with it the treat of ending the family bloodline, the individualizing techniques grew and pushed back against the totalizing and refused to obey the reason of state. Despite that within their subjectivities were sense of national identity and calling, this did not outweigh for many the inherent need for sons. Many female infants were abandoned or killed, to such an extent that the government put forth warnings regarding the killing of female infants. The desperation of the rural population eventually caused the state to modify the OCP, to allow them to have two children if the first one was not a son. In other words, the individualizing techniques and the shepherd-flock game influenced the government and lead to a change in policy, which reflected the male favouring from the state and all the way down to the individual (Rao and Sexton, 2010). The positivities set forth by the authoritarian state influenced the subjectivities on a different level depending on geography. At the year of implementation and the five to ten year following, the subjectivity of male favouring became even more pronounced in the rural areas, where in juxtaposition in the urban, it declined. The amount of children became shifted away from the Confucian ideal, which was painted as an obstacle for China's modernity. The conflicts on the country side contributed to the notion of rural population being backwards vs. the modernized higher quality urban population. The notion of modernity and nation underwent a reshaping where modernity became tied into the OCP and the re-arranged family structure. The survival and improvement of the nation, was put forth as contingent on the lessening and reshaping of the family structure.

Generally in this time period the moulding of the subjectivities were mostly successful in the urban areas, where the local cadres were able to create a tight network of control and did not face the same socioeconomic problems as the rural population. The urban population started to step away from the male favouring beliefs as they imbedded the positivities of the state into their subjectivities, which included accepting the single child, even if it was female. Something that was easier for the urban families as they did not have the same level of dependency as the rural families. The subjectivity changes for the rural population were a much slower process when it came to the generation of the families that experienced the implementation of the OCP. During this generation, the transformation of positivities into subjectivities was nowhere near as effect and complete as in the urban areas, due to the rural population refusing to change their family structure (Rao and Sexton, 2010).

Summarization of Subjectivity Shifts

During the implementation of the OCP, the Chinese experienced a change in subjectivity in several aspects. Before the implementation of the OCP the population had the right to choose how many children they wanted themselves. The subjectivity then was to have a lot of children as they would help out in the house, take care of the elderly and would provide for the family. However when the OCP was implemented this subjectivity changed, where reproduction was put in a light of national calling and national identity. The population surrendered themselves to the number the government had put forth. Reproduction was now no longer something decided by the individual, but something that had to be done for the nation.

Furthermore the female body was seen as a tool for modernization, as the female would help China on its path to modernization by pursuing the OCP. The female body was becoming the body of bio-political struggle, emphasizing the bio-politics going on in China.

As the government of China made good use of the fact of the humiliation the population felt, and the need for a firm grip on society, it had a chance of succeeding. The population felt it was in need of a change, due to the positivities put forth by the government. Thus everything that would help China back on its feet held a certain appeal. By tying the policy into national feelings and turning this into national identity the population would normalize anything the government would implement. By agreeing on the national identity and by the government pushing its people onto agreeing to this, the population policy leads to the removal of privacy, giving the government strong control over its population. Bodily matters are matters of the person involved, but by the population agreeing to the policy it becomes normal for the state to now intervene and decide on these matters.

The population wanted to elevate the nation after the humiliations of the 1800-1900s and prove themselves to the rest of the world. However in the rural areas there was more resistance. The imbedding of the positivities into the rural areas' subjectivities took much longer. It was harder for the government to keep a firm hold on the rural areas as they were more separate, leaving space for the rural areas to resist the policy.

The national identity that existed in China at that time received minor alterations as it became more interconnected with the bio-politics of reproduction, as the state tied this into the national identity. The bio-politics was strengthened by inserting them into the national identity.

Chapter 3 - From Quantity to Quality and Its Consequences For The Labour Market

The Emphasis on Quality and Modernization

The Chinese state and the surrounding positivities concerning population control and management of the reproduction of its people, have always had an aspect of quality tied into it. However it was first brought to the forefront in the 1990's. In 1985 a paper called the "Ugly Chinaman" was published by a Taiwanese author where it reached the mainland and spread like wildfire. The article itself, talked about cultural obstructions in China, and how they could hamper the modernization of the nation.

In essence it was a critical look regarding the quality of the Chinese population, and this had a heavy influence on the intellectual circles of China (Anagnost, 1997: 117-137). China's perceived failure of modernization was starting to be tied into problems regarding the quality of its people on a more deliberate and conscious level. This would serve as the stepping stone for the creation of epistemes that concerned itself with the quality of the Chinese population.

The state aided this notion by publishing an immense report regarding poverty in China, that shifted the blame onto the rural population and their backwardness and thus opened up for the recast of the symbolics of blood in China. Expert knowledge became generated by the intellectual urban elite and party workers that used this as a narrative that allowed them to push for a higher quality population. The reason of state concerned itself with the creation of docile effective working bodies, and creating positivities that entailed concerns about quality, efficiency, modernity and national calling (Anagnost, 1997: 117-137). These positivities are bio-political in nature, due to their objectives of managing and improving the human body according to the standards set forth by the totalizing techniques of the state.

The Chinese population, in particularly the urban one, adopted these positivities quite fast. A lot of credit for that goes to the narrative presented by the government and the media regarding what constitutes quality. Through the OCP, population had already been problematized on a quantitative level, where the expert knowledge presented overpopulation as something that equalled starvation and failure to modernize. Now they set forth a narrative that shaped and presented positivities that rooted themselves in the fears of the population and their sense of failure and frustration as nation (Anagnost, 1997: 117-137).

The fears worked on several levels. On a national stage, there were economical concerns regarding China's ability to modernize and compete with other nations. China in particular looked at several surrounding Asian nations, which had managed to modernize at a much faster and successful rate than China. This frustrated the Chinese sense of national destiny, as they believed themselves to be the superior nation that needed to take their rightful place as the leading nation of the world. China seemed to be constantly chasing the wind regarding its own modernity, with no end in sight (Anagnost, 1997: 117-137). The population problem narrative had already spoken about the quantity issues of the Chinese for over 10 years by then, but anxieties regarding social chaos and instability took an even stronger presence. Overpopulation meant trouble with starvation but the discourse also offered a path for the shift of quality. The uncivilized/non-wenming population set forth in discourse as the proverbial ball and chain holding down China. Not only did the rural masses present a problem in their numbers, but now also their lack of quality (Anagnost, 1997: 117-137).

Besides that the mass of bodies had a strong influence in skewering the gender ratio of the nation due to their quest for sons. This now aided the totalizing techniques of the authoritarian state in painting a picture of incoming social instability due to the excessive amount of males, a creation that was mainly blamed on the rural population. The high amount of males was publicized as being likely to turn towards alcoholism and violence as they were unable to find women to marry and create a family with (Anagnost, 1997: 133).

Literature describing social instability constituted a new sort of journalism that assumed to expose the dark side of China. Articles about women being treated as commodities that were kidnapped and sold as brides to desperate men became wide spread in the cities. Almost pornographic in their description where they sought to transfer the sense of horror of these kidnapped females onto the reader. The stories are tales of horror caused by the social instability that haunts what seems like the uncivilized country side, and not the 'real China'. In grand scheme of things, the literature helped create a notion of social instability and risk of further chaos, should the OCP fail and the quality of the population not be improved. The narrative essentially a constructed social reality or in other words a positivity that held its basis in games of truth produced by the narrative. This sense of incoming doom and problemization was further aided by a sense of race against time regarding China's population and abilities as a socialist state. It was vital for China to not fail, as it would serve as a huge humiliation to the Chinese if the socialist system would collapse.

The race against time served as an enforcer of the inner watchman inducing a sense of perpetual need to modify one own behaviour and improve upon the ethical choices and conduct of the self. This interlinked in with the games of truth, which presented the need for modernization and higher quality as an essential aspect of the success of the socialist system. The discourse and expert knowledge that shaped the epistemes surrounding the notions of quality and China's ever eluding modernity underwent a fast epistemological thaw, heavily assisted by the narrative presenting China's modernization as something that was quickly fading away, unless actions were taken immediately.

Another reason for its fast success can be attributed to the feelings of frustrations within the Chinese population, in particularly the urban one. The ethics constituting the national identity shaped subjectivities of the Chinese to be the modern successful people. To be the ethical being, one must be modern. The backwardness of the rural population was revealed as non-ethical beings in the sense that they had failed to modernize unlike the urban population. This aided into the recast of symbolics of blood concerning the modern soul of the Chinese individual.

The rural population was considered within this positivity as beings of lower quality, versus the urban, where their bodies were inscribed upon as having higher value due to their perceived higher quality and state of *wenming*. They were the proper ethical beings that were aiding China towards its modernity. This stands in contrast to the discourse regarding rural population, where it was even joked upon as being better off if they were all killed for the sake of China's modernity.

The positivities regarding quality etc. favoured the urban subjectivities and the already long seeded notions of the rural population of being second class citizens, something that the Hukou system and the conflicts regarding the implementation of the OCP had already added to. The epistemological thaw and alterations in subjectivities of the urban population were swift, and the rural populations served as convenient scapegoats for the feelings of failure and frustrations within the subjectivities of the Chinese, in particularly the urban. The discourse and epistemes fit in their subjectivities as a logical reason for why China continued to be unable to fulfil their national destiny. Primarily the Chinese urban population would measure up the Chinese children's bodies against the ones of the West. In the following account, the anthropologist Ann Anagnost was on a trip to China with her family, which included her infant son. She experienced firsthand how the Chinese people, inscribed values of strength, intelligence, curiosity and vitality upon his body just because he was Western. They would comment on

the glow of his skin, the size of his body and squeeze his arms and legs, as if testing the strength of them. The expressed appreciative comments had underlining melancholy, as if they had sized up the competition and found their own players lacking in comparison. The inherent sense of failure that hunts the national identity and the population problem discourse creates a sense of having to improve themselves in order to catch up and overcome their rivals (Anagnost, 1997).

This has led to an almost pathological consumerist culture, where tons of money is being thrown at the children in the idea that it will make up for the inherent lack of the Chinese. A desperate attempt at going from knowing what they consider quality to be, to trying to create quality as a way of being. The bodies of the first generation of the one child policy was being shaped as the hope of China, facing its own self-created obstacle known as its lack of quality. The bodies became something that needed to not only be moulded by the totalizing techniques, seeking to discipline it and generate docile workers, but it also needed to be improved by the individualizing techniques.

The Genealogy of Quality - The Young Generation

The success of the OCP in urban areas made way for the new family structure, where the economical future of its elders was depending on a single child. The quantitative to qualitative shift had a huge impact on the formation of this new generation born from 1979-1989, which is often referred to as the 80's. The moulding of the subjectivities of the older generation had resulted in a general acceptance and approval of the implementation of the one child policy. (As a definition the older generation is characterized as born from the 1950's and until the actual implementation). It was this generation that underwent the epistemological thaw regarding the quantity to quality shift and transferred it on to their children.

In the years after the implementation of the one child policy the focus of the birth planning worker was slowly changed, which meant that the approach of the totalizing techniques were changed. The government's ideological education after the inception of the one child policy, involved information on eugenics, the right education and nurturing of the single child. In the 1990's there became a much stronger emphasis on the nurturing the excellence of the child. This meant that the birth planning workers changed the focus of their work from the encouraging of one child per family to support the improvements of the single children's education and nurturing etc. through individualizing techniques. Through its totalizing techniques, the state sought to create an archaeology regarding what constitutes quality, and its primary techniques involved education, nurturing, consumerism and eugenics. Those

facets were meant to frame what would be considered to be a higher quality modern Chinese. This particularly goes for the first generation of the OCP, that now needed to have a higher quality body and mind.

Higher education was meant to cultivate and improve the interior and help make the Chinese population more civilized, competitive and better. The nurturing was a vital part of making up for the self-perceived lacks of the Chinese body and mind compared to the Western body. It would also help shape the proper ethical being that would assist the nation to reach its modernity and national destiny. The consumerism worked as a tool where the children's bodies became a repository to place material goods on, in order to increase the quality of said bodies. The bio-politics became intertwined with this heavy consumerism from the families, where individualizing techniques took centre stage in their quest for the grooming and creation of the perfect wenming child. Another influence regarding the heavy consumerism is that the parents did not have that kind of variety in toys and clothes and so on, which also meant that they wanted to give their children more and better material goods. Accompanied by the economical rise in the country, families had more money to spend and because they only have one child to spend their money on and to put their energy in, they often exaggerated in how many things they give to their child and how much they pressure their child in becoming the best of the best in everything.

The re-arrangement of the interior put a strong focus on the shepherd flock game, where the mind and ethics of the Chinese, in particular the children had to be improved in order for the created archaeology of quality to become a genealogy.

“I have no free time on my weekend because all I do is prepare for the college entrance exams. I study physics, math, English, literature, and history every day. I am competing against 200,000 other kids so I must do all I can to do well. It's a hard life, but I want to make my parents proud.” (Nie and Wyman, 2005: 331)

This quote is by an 18-year-old boy, it illustrates how the majority of Chinese parents raise their children to study hard and be the best. This is caused by the epistemological thaw regarding the need for improved quality. But this quest for quality in the urban areas have contributed to the urban 80's viewing themselves as superior compared to the rural population. The positivity turned subjectivity promotes the improvement of quality by the individualizing techniques, which the state promotes through its totalizing techniques such as the press. This is process of recast of the symbolics of blood,

where the template regarding what is the modern Chinese individual, is tied to a notion of higher quality than other parts of the population. This aspect of symbolics of blood has on the other hand led to an understanding, that quality is not as improved in the rural areas as in the urban as this quote gives an impression of;

“We are more advanced and educated, so we know that having many kids is a bad decision. They, in the countryside, cannot understand this. They do not live in the same progressive environment that we do, so they will prefer to stick to tradition and have many kids. Our societies are very different in this way” (Nie and Wyman, 2005: 326).

This quote is from an 80's and you can see the clear distinction he makes, regarding the rural and urban when talking about different societies. The view of the rural population as inferior has led to a sense of superiority in a large amount of urban youth.

From Emperor To Worker – The Urban Labour Issue

The urban 80's generation has been spoiled heavily by their parents while being groomed to be the best. Inscribing themselves as the more cultivated and higher educated helps them with identifying themselves as the higher quality Chinese and therefore the more modern one set forth in the national identity and media. The parents influence' here plays heavily, all in framed by the OCP and the strong need for modernization found in the Chinese population. Many of the urban 80's have been characterized as spoiled, self-entitled and egocentric, which has been dubbed as the little emperor syndrome. These little emperors are being pressured by their families to perform and prove that they were a worthy investment. As a totality these little emperors are causing great difficulties in the urban cities labour markets.

Unlike their parents, many of them are highly educated. Their families have spent a lot of money on ensuring a good education and private lessons. Problem is that these little emperors are not used to not being the centre of attention. Parents are known for giving in to every little whim they have (Crowell & Hsieh, Urban Youth Workers Institute: online). The self-inscribed higher quality that the little emperors possess makes it hard for them to become integrated into the labour market. They have a tendency to be unaccustomed regarding the proper way of conducting themselves in a working environment. This shows in an example in the following interview discussing the 80's generation and them entering the labour market:

“In general, they were the center of their universes growing up, and now the whole constellation has changed. They're now workers. Several HR managers we spoke to described this generation in general as moodier, more demanding, a friend of mine even said that they take personal calls when they're interviewing. What surveys show clearly is human resources is the number one source of angst for businesses in China.” (Marketplace; One-Child Workers: A Generation of Little Emperors: online)

Unlike the parents generation where positivities regarding Confucianism and nation was imbedded deeply into their subjectivities, this urban 80's generation have grown up in a very different environment than their parents. The idea of striving towards becoming the modern Chinese does not seem to be the primary driving force behind this generation. They already perceive themselves as modern as stated by all three interviewees that hailed from Shanghai. They are aware of their capabilities and are not scared of asking for things as shown in the following statement:

“... So they have these only children who have sky-high expectations. One manager says his workers expect to be promoted every two years, and a 10 percent raise every year. Well think about, then, that China manager for a multinational company. He or she has to call headquarters back and say Detroit, and ask for double-digit personel raises. And Detroit says, "No, this is a recession -- call back when you're sober." So have a little pity for HR managers in China, this is a challenging generation of new workers to deal with.”” (Marketplace, One-Child Workers: A Generation of Little Emperors: Online)

The little emperors are causing problems for managers, unfamiliar at having responsibilities they can underperform. One of our interviewees told us how he got fired three times at first when he entered the labour market. He told us that it was because he was not used being accountable to others nor listening to orders. These problems do not prevent employers from hiring the young generation, as they need people to fill in positions. The little emperors are still highly educated and with the proper tools they can function as a proper work force:

“I mean this is a whole generation of people. And for all the complaints, this generation has a lot going for it. They're much more educated than ever before and they're known to learn quickly. So given the right incentives, they will produce. Now if you're the company and you get it wrong, they will bolt. The turnover rate in Shanghai is something like 20 percent, compared to like 5 percent in advanced economies” (Tong, One-Child Workers: A Generation of Little Emperors: Online)

The little emperor syndrome is not the only phenomenon to have come from the OCP. Others issues plagues it as well, which is affecting the labour market in different way.

Population Aging and The 4:2:1 Problem

The one child policy has had several unplanned consequences, which have affected the societal structure in China. One of those consequences is the 4:2:1 problem which explains the shaping of the family structure after the implementation of the one child policy. This problem can be identified now as the people born after the implementation of the policy have children themselves. This development means that in a family the adults in the working age, have to support their four old parents and one child (Greenhalgh, 2008: 182).

The Chinese fertility rate was 5,8 in 1970, which means that Chinese women in average gave birth to 5,8 children during their lives. In 2004, only 34 years later, had the fertility rate declined to 1,8 births in average per woman (Jackson and Howe, 2004: 8). This was due to improvements in health care, nutrition and sanitation. Furthermore the improvements meant that the life expectancy was significantly increased and risen from 41 years in the 1950's to 70 years in the 1990's (Jackson and Howe, 2004: 8-9).

An important factor of the decline in birth-rates, besides the one child policy, was the modernization of China. The Chinese government used the national identity as an imbedded aspect of the Chinese population's subjectivities to achieve the goals of modernization. Birth planning was an integrated part of the modernization plan set forth by the government. Therefore this achievement became important to the Chinese population because if they failed to become modernized the outside world would consider them backwards and that would affect their national sense of pride.


The people born during the baby boom of the 1950's and 1960's are now in their working age but will in the upcoming years start to retire. The UN projects that the number of people in the working age will peak in 2015 and after that it will decline. This means that the younger generations who were born after the 1970's will have to replace the older generations in the work force (Jackson and Howe, 2004: 10). However, as the numbers of elders are growing are the younger generations shrinking as a result of the decline in birth-rates. Therefore the number of young people to take care of the elders is declining. This

ideal is also based in the Confucian tradition that the younger generations have to support and take care of the elders (Milwertz, 1997: 44-45). As this quote of a young woman from Beijing illustrates:

“Both of my parents have small pensions. So you can imagine the pressure on me” (Mian, 2007: 27)

This extraordinary pressure on the young generation is caused by the 4:2:1 problem. The people born before the implementation of the one child policy had several children who can support them in their old age. The people born after the implementation on the other hand have to carry burden of supporting and taking care of their parents and in some cases also grandparents all by themselves.

Figure 3. Working-Age Chinese to Elderly Chinese



Source: “The graying of the Middle Kingdom” by Richard Jackson and Neil Howe, 2004

This figure shows the scenario of the ratio of working age people to elderly people from 1950 to 2050. It shows that in 1950 there were 8 working age adults to support one elder person and today (2011) there are approximately 5 working age adults per elder person. If this development continues as the figure shows there will in 2050 only be 2 working age adults per elder person. However, this figure does not show if the number of elders have grown but it illustrates the 4:2:1 problem as a declining number of people in the working age will have to support the elders.

The OCP Effect on Equality in Connection With The Labour Market


The first big change regarding the legacy of male dominance in the fight for a greater gender equality happened in 1979. To raise the status of women in China the CCP put forward four major changes in the

traditions of Chinese society. These changes were made to make it easier for women to accept the one child policy, and thereby preventing women from having children or getting married at an early age. The most important of these four changes was the economical empowering of women, which led to the re-shaping of the subjectivity where men were working alongside women. Women were working in the same sectors with men, and even though the pay of a woman was lower, they became an important part of the workforce and of their families income. As a result of this change women were forced to work because they had to help support their families. While doing this they did not have time to also take care of a child, thereby diminishing the chance that women would even start having children or getting married.

Another gender-equalizing change that occurred was reopening universities after the Cultural Revolution. This meant that woman and men were now allowed to apply for higher-level institutions, even though they in the past were denied, giving the women another reason to not have children. As most of the woman in the childbearing age, they automatically had a new focus in life. This focus was being dedicated to education and work instead of giving in to the familial pressure of having children (Nie and Wyman: 2006).

This positivity was implemented in the population's subjectivity in order to decrease the chances for more population growth. Creating an environment that now had a totally different family structure, where both husband and wife worked to earn enough money for their family. Passing this subjectivity on to their own child, which can be seen in the results of China having more and more women in educational institutions. This figure below shows how the percentage of women has been going up since 1990 until 2000.

Figure 4: Main years of education, 1990-2000



Source: China population census in 1990 and 2000. 1% sample survey on population change in 1995 in Women and Men in China Facts and Figures 2004.

The generation of the implementation of the OCP wanted more children but did not have more children, because of the positivities and mode subjectivation. Whereas many of the women of the 80's in the urban areas do not even want more children. Some even see a child as a burden as they then cannot keep up with their demanding work. This is also because of the increasing demands put onto females in order to keep up with males, as a woman will have a hard time finding a good job if she does not have a decent education. If she does have a college degree, but chooses to have a family before having a job it is seen as a professional setback to become pregnant and leave early in her career (Nie and Wyman: 2005).

The need to succeed in the labour force, due to pressure of family to do well, has changed the mindset of women towards birth planning. Before having children was still a high priority whereas now the childbearing has become almost last on the list for urban women. In the end this development strengthens the OCP, as women prefer to have a career first and later on maybe start a family life. Thus by limiting the body of the female, the government strengthened the individuality of many of the Chinese females – an aspect of the individualizing techniques.

In the urban areas the domination of males has been going down, mostly because both males and females have more equal chances than the children in the rural areas. With only having one child the parents cannot spend money unequally between boys and girls. They are now obliged to provide their child, male or female, with the funds they have for the next generation. As reflected in one of our interviews with Huan Zhou, she explained: *“Right now it does not matter for parents anymore if their child will be a boy or a girl. Right now they just want them to succeed, in urban areas the chances for males and females are pretty equal.”*

With the equal treatment of parents between males and females the traditional reasons for having a boy rather than a female are not valid anymore (Nie and Wyman: 2005). The bio-politics of the state, leads to an increased appreciation of any child, as it is better to one than none.

Women may have been accepted amongst the men in the labour market, but this does not mean that the women are treated as equals. The wages a woman in China makes is only 63.5% of what a Chinese man makes in the same labour force (facts and details; working women in China: online). However Chinese economists claim that the OCP will provide for a solution, as Chi Wei mentions: *“The policy has also helped change traditional attitudes about girls. If your only child is a girl, you want her to be a success.*

That's why we believe the one child policy helps to reduce [the] gender pay gap in the cities"
(McKinsey Quarterly, China's 'sticky floor': online)

The change of subjectivity has changed the structure of the labour market, where male and female now work in the same areas. As there is still an imbalance between males and females, this has led to pressure amongst the genders, as the men work longer and have more employment time than females. It will result in a bigger supply of workers and with that put more pressure on the women (money.163: online). In industrial areas where females have a perceived advantage in e.g. textile or service, there will be men employed, as the surplus in men will result in men looking for jobs in female dominated areas. However the pressure is felt on both sides, for the males it will become more and more difficult to find a job where women have an advantage, as there is a surplus in males (202.112.78.101: online).

The pressure put on the men has pushed them to evolve their abilities, as they are forced to look for work in areas that before the OCP and thus before the surplus of males, would have been considered female (202.112.78.101: online). As reflected through our interviews both Lien Wu and Xiaofing Chen they explained; *'in the past few years there are a lot more males in for example department stores such as lingerie and make-up stores, selling female products. It is kind of funny.'*

Generally the bio-politics has through its applying of totalizing techniques made the body of the females the battlefield in where the reproduction was problematized and put in focus. A loss of agency regarding this area has taken place for many Chinese females but on the other hand, the relentless pushing for lower birth-rates, resulted in the females become more individualized.

Evolution of The Rural Population and Its Effect on The Labour Market

From previous chapters we went through how the subjectivities of the rural population reacted to the different positivities set forth by the government. When the national identity came it was the beginning of the rural population being looked upon as second class citizen, and the start of the rural and urban divide. The implementation of the Hukou system put more emphasis on this as different rights and privileges were dependent on which Hukou one had, with the rural one being down-prioritized. The Hukou system that was enforced over 40 years ago, was meant to control and keep the rural population from migrating and flooding the cities, and to create social stability and a strong structure. The symbolics of blood and notion of quality was being shaped with the Hukou system, and the massive checking and punishments served to the increase of panopticism and the inner watchman, which

affected their behaviour even after the checking stopped. In the end of the Great Leap Forward there were no uprising and no riots in spite of their capability to do so. The nation calling of modernization was higher than basic human needs of food, and even though stories raged about cannibalism and over 40 million people dying. They were kept in check by the panopticism and the acceptance of the positivities set forth by the government.

When the implementation of the OCP happened it was too much for the rural population as it was threatening the loss of bloodline. The Confucian beliefs clashed with the positivities of needing fewer children. Uprising began and attacks on the birth planning workers took place out of desperation, in their desire of preserving the bloodline. The panopticism which kept the rural population in check, when millions of people died of starvation, lost its control. They were kept down by strong totalizing techniques and the positivities were enforced. The rural population became branded as more non-wenming and being a hindrance to the national identity and modernization of China.

A point which can be seen in the following quote: *“as urbanites enjoyed more and more government subsidies, better protection, and higher incomes, they also came to believe themselves as being superior to rural people. This became the historical and psychological basis for the discrimination toward rural people.”* (Fleisher & Yang, 2005: 17). More so most people are still trying to migrate into the urban areas because of the better wages and privileges. Nonetheless even if the Hukou system has been “relaxed” and getting reformed in some areas, most places they are not allowed to reside permanently in the city even though they work there. The estimated number of people which are known as the ‘floating population’ is thought to be around 211 million, which is about 16% of the total population (Xinhua, 2011)

The OCP became a symbol of punishment for the rural population and the consequences 30 years later of the implementation can be felt now. The aftermaths of the one child policy is starting to show in the rural areas massive labour force. A survey done by the Development Research Center of The State Council, which covered 2,749 villages in 17 provinces, shows that on average 74% of the villages no longer any surplus labourers available to work in distant cities (Zhong, 2007). The lower birth-rate has now been in effect for so long that the consequences can be seen in several aspects. China’s main strength economically is the investors using China as the world’s factory floor, especially because of the cheap labour force. However the lack of labour force lead to higher wage demands and higher taxes (Zhong, 2007). This was seen in the east-coast regions where the lack of labour force made the average

wage increase from 781 yuan (US\$102) in 2003 to 953 yuan (US\$125) in 2006. As a result 2600-8000 small and medium-sized enterprises pulled out of the Pearl River Delta Region (Zhong, 2007). Even with the high rise in wage, for the rural population there is still a big gap in a ratio of 2-3 times higher wages for the urbanites (Fleisher & Yang, 2005).

The government is being blamed for the current labour shortage in the rural areas because of the imposing of the OCP. However the government does not want to change it now as they see it as a “long-term national policy” (Zhong, 2007).

A new era of uprisings are looming in the Chinese rural areas, and much of the credit can go to the OCP and the symbolics of blood. Social unrest is brewing over land confiscation, the rigid Hukou system and environmental degradation for the local development projects (Lum, 2006). Some of the issues lies in the contracts most peasants have with the use of their land, as they have a long 30 year contract with the local government. However they do not own the rights to the land nor the right to sell it, they only have the right to use it. When the land is sold they get compensated based on the amount of production and the resettlement costs (Lum, 2006). However the local government takes a grand share of the selling of land-use right over to the developers. This has led to violent clashes not only in the poor rural areas, but also in the rich coastal areas where the pressure of development is high. The selling of the land-use has gone to international companies. The rural population are being down prioritized yet again, as the symbolics of blood has placed them even lower than foreigners. The strive for modernization takes priority over the livelihood of the rural population as set forth by the reason of state.

A girl was killed in the Guandong province in January 2006 when over thousands protestants clashed with police because of the lack of compensation. There have been in the last six years over eight reported events of feuds between rural peasants and local officials with arrests and reported deaths (Lum, 2006). The provinces involved were amongst the provinces, which were under most pressure of totalizing techniques of the one child policy such as forced abortions and heavy fines both in the past and in recent times (McElRoy, 2001). The national identity is not as strong now as it was back in the Great Leap Forward, where the food quotas were met with little resistance by the individual. However after the implementation of the one child policy resistance increased, and at the same time the mode of subjectivation decreased in the subjectivities of the rural population. The family bloodline and the individual mattered more for them now than the calling of the nation. Almost a decade of being treated

as second grade citizens, the rural population is seemingly reaching their breaking point due to the problems stemming from the implementation of the one child policy.

Conclusion

The continuous humiliation of the Chinese population since the 19th century opened the door for the positivities set forth by the government in the early 20th century. It made it easier for the government to create the notion of national identity and class struggle while tying it to quality and modernization. When Mao came to power he was in great doubt on how to handle the increasing population, changing his mind several times between a bigger population and birth planning. In his attempt to modernize China in the Great Leap Forward, he tightened the Hukou system to control migration and increased the notion of separation between the rural and urban areas. The Hukou system was also a start of the rise of the administrative state. The rural/urban divide was further enforced during the starvation in the end of the Great Leap Forward, where urbanites got special rights and more food, while up to 40 million of the rural population starved to death. The strong ties to the mode of subjectivation and national identity kept the rural from uprising and instead ended dying for the reason of state.

Shortly after the Great Leap Forward, problematization of the population debates became more frequent. This resulted in that in 1979 the government started the implementation of the one child policy. It led to severe confrontations between the rural population and the birth planning workers. This happened because the positivities set forth by the government clashed with the Confucian belief, which was deeply imbedded into the subjectivities of the rural population. However the urbanites accepted the policy without much fuss, which can be credited to the tight control network and the modernization already taking place. Throughout the whole process, especially people in urban areas, were subjected to media propaganda. An aspect of this was the state trying to set forth the conduct of conduct. The self-regulating inner watchman was being guided by the media, in how it should act in order for a person to still be an ethical being. Another facet of the implementation period was the state increasing the equality of women, as they gained more rights because of the one child policy; since they were encouraged to enter the labour market instead of focusing on having children.

The one child policy became shortly after implementation also focused towards creating a higher quality. This resulted in the rural area being branded as non-wenming and of low quality. In a sense the PCC succeeded in creating high quality children, which were highly educated as they had several talents and skills to draw on. The backside of the medal is that the current generation of highly educated bodies was overly spoiled, and their work ethics are terrible. On top of that they have extremely high demands, which cannot be met by the average employer. The one child policy also created a sustainability

problem known as the 4:2:1 problem. The amount of people retiring, from the older generation of many children, is far greater than the amount of little emperors entering the labour market. The rural population also seems to have reached a breaking point, as they have since the implementation of the one child policy been less and less obedient compared to previous times.

After thoughts

We could have used different theories and we could have focused on different areas such as the violation of Human Rights. Use of different theorists could have provided us with more discussion in our analytical chapters. Furthermore it could have given a whole different view on the subject. We could have gone deeper into the Cultural Revolution as the opening up of the economical borders was tightly interlinked with this. We could also have focused on only the girls of the OCP, as there is this big imbalance between boys and girls, where girls are considered to be the inferior gender. We could also have delved deeper into the issues of the unregistered and the floating population.

Working process

The goal of this project was to investigate the bio-political tools used by the government to implement the OCP. Furthermore we wanted to investigate what effects the OCP then would have on the labour market. In order to research this we started by mapping out the theories of Michel Foucault on government, bio-politics and governmentality, which we would use to analyse this problem.

While working on this project there have been some difficulties in finding enough empiria to analyse on. Furthermore a field trip to the country and interviews with people in different urban and rural areas could have been beneficial. Luckily we got in contact with people from China who was born in the first generation of the OCP.

Throughout the whole process the group has had a good co-operation and we followed a work schedule from the first week of the semester start. We had group meetings minimum once a week and we kept close contact with each other through out the whole process.

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